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I. INTRODUCTION
In 1991, a dispute settlement panel of the General Agreement on Tariffs
and Trade (GATT)1 concluded that U.S. restrictions on the importation of tuna
caught by encircling dolphins2 violated the GATT’s prohibition against import

1. General Agreement on Tariffs and Trade, Oct. 30, 1947, 61 Stat. A-11, 55 U.N.T.S. 194,
reprinted in BASIC INSTRUMENTS AND SELECTED DOCUMENTS [BISD] 4th Supp. 1 (1969)
[hereinafter GATT 1947]. During the negotiations that established the World Trade Organization
(WTO), GATT 1947 was amended to replace the phrase “Contracting Parties” with “Members.”
It is now known as GATT 1994. General Agreement on Tariffs and Trade─Multilateral Trade
Negotiations (The Uruguay Round): Final Act Embodying the Results of the Uruguay Round of
Multilateral Trade Negotiations, Dec. 15, 1993, (The Uruguay Round) Doc. MTN/FA, 33 I.L.M.
1 (1994).
2. In the 1970s, more than 400,000 dolphins were dying in tuna nets each year in the
Eastern Tropical Pacific Ocean (ETP). As a consequence, the United States took action to stop
this mortality under the U.S. Marine Mammal Protection Act (MMPA). 16 U.S.C. § 1361 (2000)
et seq. The MMPA prohibits the “taking” (harassment, hunting, capture, killing, or attempt
thereof) and importation into the United States of marine mammals, except where an exception is
explicitly authorized. In addition, it seeks to reduce the incidental kill or serious injury of marine
mammals in the course of commercial fishing to insignificant levels approaching zero. With
regard to the ETP tuna fishery, Section 101(a)(2) of the MMPA authorizes limited incidental
taking of marine mammals by United States fishermen in the course of commercial fishing
pursuant to a permit issued by the National Marine Fisheries Service (NMFS), in conformity with
and governed by certain statutory criteria in sections 103 and 104 and implementing regulations.
At the time Mexico initiated a GATT dispute over these provisions in the late 1980s, only one
such permit had been issued, to the American Tuna Boat Association, covering all domestic tuna
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restrictions.3 Not only did the Tuna/Dolphin dispute awaken environmentalists
to the GATT, but it also galvanized them to try to influence the ongoing
negotiations among Canada, Mexico and the United States over the North
American Free Trade Agreement (NAFTA).4
Environmentalists ultimately succeeded in shaping the debate over how
NAFTA should address the impacts of trade on the environment. While
Canada, Mexico and the United States did not reopen NAFTA to revise the
substantive rules of trade liberalization, they did successfully negotiate and
adopt an environmental side agreement formally known as the North American
Agreement on Environmental Cooperation (NAAEC).5 Two underlying
concerns animate the NAAEC. First, environmentalists believed NAFTA
would have competitiveness effects6—that Mexico’s relatively weak
enforcement of environmental laws would increase environmentally harmful
investment in Mexico, thereby creating pollution havens. Second,
environmentalists worried that trade liberalization generally might impair the
environment not only in Mexico but throughout North America.
As a consequence, the NAAEC’s provisions center on mitigating these two
concerns. To support capacity building in Mexico specifically and to foster
fishing operations in the ETP. Under the general permit issued to this Association, no more than
20,500 dolphins could be incidentally killed or injured each year by the U.S. fleet fishing in the
ETP. Within this dolphin mortality limit, no more than 250 could be coastal spotted dolphins
(Stenella attenuata) and no more than 2,750 could be Eastern spinner dolphins (Stenella
longirostris). Also at the time of the dispute, Section 101(a)(2) of the MMPA banned the
importation of commercial fish or fish products caught with commercial fishing technology that
results in the incidental kill or incidental serious injury of ocean mammals in excess of U.S.
standards. It specifically prohibited the importation of yellowfin tuna harvested with purse-seine
nets in the ETP unless the Secretary of Commerce certified that (1) the government of the
harvesting country has a program regulating the taking of marine mammals that is comparable to
that of the United States, and (2) the average rate of incidental taking of marine mammals by
vessels of the harvesting nation is comparable to, but must not exceed 1.25 times, the average rate
of such taking by U.S. vessels during the same period.
3. Report of the Panel, United States—Restrictions on Imports of Tuna, GATT, DS21/R
(Sept. 3, 1991) (unadopted), reprinted in 30 I.L.M. 1594 (1991) (Tuna/Dolphin I). In a later
dispute, a panel ruled that U.S. restrictions on tuna imported from countries that had previously
imported tuna from countries that caught tuna by encircling dolphins also violated Article XI of
the GATT. Report of the Panel, United States—Restrictions on Imports of Tuna, GATT, DS29/R
(June 16, 1994) (unadopted), reprinted in 33 I.L.M. 839 (1994) (Tuna/Dolphin II).
4. North American Free Trade Agreement, U.S.-Can.-Mex., Dec. 17, 1992, 32 I.L.M. 296
(1993), 32 I.L.M. 605 (1993), reprinted in International Legal Materials 32:296, 32:605 (1993)
[hereinafter NAFTA]. NAFTA was implemented in the United States through Pub. L. No. 103182, 107 Stat. 2057 (1993).
5. North American Agreement on Environmental Cooperation, U.S.-Can.-Mex., Sept. 14,
1993, 32 I.L.M. 1480 [hereinafter NAAEC]. The NAAEC is not technically an international
treaty, which required Senate ratification. Instead, it was enacted through an Executive Order of
the President. Exec. Order No. 12,915, 59 Fed. Reg. 25,775 (May 18, 1994).
6. For a more complete discussion of competitiveness effects, see infra Section II.A.
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protection of the entire North American environment, the NAAEC encourages
cooperation among the Parties. It does so principally by creating a new
international institution, the Commission for Environmental Cooperation
(CEC), designed not only to address trade-environment linkages but also to
It also
coordinate environmental policy throughout North America.7
establishes a Secretariat to help the Parties implement a cooperative
environmental work program.8 The Secretariat also has independent authority
to prepare reports on matters within the scope of the cooperative work program
without the need for governmental approval.9 To prevent competitiveness
effects, the NAAEC requires Parties to ensure high levels of environmental
protection and to effectively enforce their environmental laws.10 The
Secretariat also has the duty to investigate citizen allegations that a Party is
failing to effectively enforce environmental law.11 The NAAEC also includes
a government process that envisages sanctions against a Party for a “persistent
failure” to enforce environmental law effectively.12 As the first agreement to
address environmental issues within the context of a trade agreement, the
NAAEC has been widely hailed as innovative.13
This initial achievement to include environmental provisions as part of a
free trade agreement, however, has masked the NAAEC’s relatively modest
achievements and impaired the creation of more suitable institutions and
mechanisms to address trade-environment linkages based on the lessons
learned from the NAAEC. First, the NAAEC’s cooperative program has
achieved some compelling environmental successes, such as providing
substantial training to Mexican environmental officials and eliminating the use
of dangerous pesticides, including chlordane and DDT.14 Nonetheless, the
CEC remains woefully underfunded at $9 million per triennium, limiting
cooperation among the Parties. Second, due to the focus on competitiveness
effects, the NAAEC has fallen short of addressing more pressing tradeenvironment issues, particularly scale effects, which are the environmental

7. NAAEC, supra note 5, art.10.
8. Id. arts. 11(5)–(6).
9. Id. art. 13.
10. Id. arts. 3, 5.
11. Id. arts. 14–15.
12. NAAEC, supra note 5, arts. 22–36.
13. See, e.g., John H. Knox & David L. Markell, The Innovative North American
Commission for Environmental Cooperation, in GREENING NAFTA: THE NORTH AMERICAN
COMMISSION FOR ENVIRONMENTAL COOPERATION 2 (David L. Markell & John H. Knox, eds.,
2003) (“[The NAAEC] has innovative tools and almost unlimited jurisdiction to address regional
environmental problems. And it provides unprecedented opportunities for participation by civil
society.”).
14. See infra Section III.B.
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impacts resulting from trade liberalization.15 In fact, whereas the work of the
CEC and others subsequent to the entry into force of the NAAEC has shown
relatively few competitiveness effects, it has shown scale effects, such as large
increases in pollution from agricultural operations or increased use of forestry
resources, from trade agreements.16 In addition, the NAAEC’s inherent
structural flaws have limited its effectiveness in implementing both its
cooperative and enforcement mandates. For example, the citizen submission
process has become extremely adversarial, with governments whittling away at
the Secretariat’s discretion to make decisions concerning the scope and
eligibility of submissions.17 These flaws have led one observer to see some
aspects of the NAAEC as “a cautionary tale counseling against simplistic
adoption of the NAFTA environmental side agreement and its submission
process as an equivalent environmental counterpart” in future trade
agreements.18
Despite the lessons that could be learned from the NAAEC, the United
States has negotiated subsequent free trade agreements (FTAs),19 such as the
Dominican Republic-Central America-United States Free Trade Agreement
(DR-CAFTA)20 and the free trade agreements with Colombia21 and Peru,22

15. For a more complete discussion of scale effects, see infra Section II(A)(2).
16. See infra Section III.A.
17. See Chris Wold et al., The Inadequacy of the Citizen Submission Process of Articles 14
& 15 of the North American Agreement on Environmental Cooperation, 26 LOY. L.A. INT’L &
COMP. L. REV. 415 (2004). See also Geoff Garver, Tooth Decay, 25 ENVTL F. 34 (2008).
18. Tseming Yang, The Effectiveness of the NAFTA Environmental Side Agreement’s Citizen
Submission Process: A Case Study of Metales y Derivados, 76 U. COLO. L. REV. 443, 445 (2005)
(making his comment in the context of the Metales y Derivados citizen submission process.) I
have liberally embraced his comment to refer to the NAAEC more broadly.
19. Since NAFTA, the United States has completed bilateral or regional FTAs with
Australia, Bahrain, Chile, Jordan, Morocco, Singapore, and, taken together under DR-CAFTA,
the Dominican Republic, Costa Rica, El Salvador, Guatemala, Honduras and Nicaragua. Two
other FTAs, with Peru and Oman, have been approved by Congress but require implementing
legislation. The United States previously negotiated an FTA with Israel. In addition, the United
States has completed negotiations with Colombia, Panama and Korea, but is waiting for
congressional approval of those agreements. The USTR is further negotiating FTAs with
Malaysia, the Southern African Customs Union (Botswana, Lesotho, Namibia, South Africa and
Swaziland), Thailand and the United Arab Emirates. See U.S. Trade Representative, Bilateral
Trade Agreements, http://www.ustr.gov/Trade_Agreements/Bilateral/Section_Index.html (last
visited Oct. 30, 2008).
20. Central America-Dominican Republic-United States Free Trade Agreement, Aug. 5,
2004, available at http://www.ustr.gov/Trade_Agreements/Regional/CAFTA/Section_Index.html
[hereinafter DR-CAFTA].
21. U.S.-Colombia Trade Promotion Agreement, U.S.-Colom., Nov. 22, 2006 (not yet in
force), available at http://www.ustr.gov/Trade_Agreements/Bilateral/Colombia_FTA/Section_
Index.html [hereinafter U.S.-Colombia FTA].
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without having evaluated the strengths and weaknesses of the NAAEC or the
valuable contributions of the CEC to understanding competitiveness effects.23
In fact, these subsequent FTAs adopt the NAAEC’s least relevant aspect—its
enforcement focus—rather than embracing the more relevant focus on
preventing scale effects. At the same time, subsequent FTAs eliminate the
most useful aspects of the NAAEC. For example, instead of mending the
inherent structural problems that allow the Parties to change the scope and
nature of a citizen submission concerning its own enforcement failure,
subsequent FTAs either eliminate the citizen submission process altogether or
sharply curtail the independence of the Secretariat. In addition, no subsequent
FTA grants a Secretariat the independence given the NAAEC’s Secretariat to
prepare reports without governmental approval. No subsequent FTA includes
an advisory committee similar to the NAAEC’s Joint Public Advisory
Committee to provide oversight and advice to the Parties. Overall, subsequent
FTAs reflect the efforts of the United States to eliminate independent
assessment of trade-environment issues and oversight of the Parties’ work
program as is now possible through the CEC.
To successfully integrate trade liberalization with environmental
protection, future FTAs must diminish the focus on enforcement and
reenvision the cooperative aspects of the NAAEC. Perhaps of most
importance, FTAs must individualize the environmental needs of trading
partners, particularly with respect to scale effects, before implementing an
FTA. The consideration of environmental needs, including the need to
strengthen relevant institutions, must precede implementation of the FTA
because trade-based economic growth and its corresponding environmental
harm generally outpace any efficiency gains24 or the development of
appropriate and effective environmental regulations.25 One FTA, the U.S.22. U.S.-Peru Trade Promotion Agreement, U.S.-Peru, April 12, 2006, (not yet in force),
available at http://www.ustr.gov/Trade_Agreements/Bilateral/Peru_TPA/Section_Index.html
[hereinafter U.S.-Peru FTA].
23. Accord Garver, supra note 17, at 39 (concluding that “[i]t is clear that environmental
mechanisms in the NAFTA package have not met their promise or potential, and yet they are
being duplicated with little analysis or meaningful modification”).
24. CEC Secretariat, Understanding and Anticipating Environmental Change in North
America: Building Blocks for Better Public Policy 3 (2003) (“Strong evidence now exists of some
decoupling between economic growth and environmental degradation. However, the North
American economy and trade flows between NAFTA partners have been growing so rapidly that
the increases in scale have tended to overwhelm the efficiency gains resulting from decoupling
factors.”).
25. Scott Vaughan, The Greenest Trade Agreement Ever?: Measuring the Environmental
Impacts of Agricultural Liberalization, in CARNEGIE ENDOWMENT FOR INTERNATIONAL PEACE,
NAFTA’S PROMISE AND REALITY: LESSONS FROM MEXICO FOR THE HEMISPHERE 61, 67 (2004)
[hereinafter NAFTA’s PROMISE AND REALITY]. Vaughan assessed the environmental impacts of
NAFTA on a number of agricultural sectors in Mexico, including maize, wheat, and fruit and
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Peru FTA, begins the process of reenvisioning the trade-and-environment
relationship. Because it is well known that Peru has extremely valuable timber
resources and woefully inadequate management and enforcement capacity in
the forestry sector, the FTA specifically requires Peru to, among other things,
increase the number and effectiveness of personnel devoted to managing
Peru’s forestry laws and enforcing Peru’s laws, regulations and other measures
relating to the harvest of, and trade in, timber products.26 Not only do these
provisions address scale effects specific to Peru, but they also attempt to
address the institutional shortcomings affecting those scale effects. Until
governments begin to incorporate scale effects and to individualize the
environmental provisions in an FTA to the specific needs of the trading
partners, FTAs will provide empty promises that trade liberalization can be
successfully integrated with environmental protection.
This article assesses the failure to incorporate the lessons learned from the
NAAEC in subsequent U.S. FTAs and reenvisions the trade-environment
relationship. Section II explores how concerns about specific tradeenvironment effects led to the adoption of the NAAEC’s focus on
enforcement. Section III analyzes the strengths and weaknesses of the
NAAEC. Section IV summarizes the environmental provisions of FTAs
negotiated since the NAAEC and describes why these provisions will not
provide significant environmental benefits or further our understanding of
trade-environment effects. Section V provides recommendations for shifting
the focus from competitiveness effects to scale effects in future FTAs,
reviewing in particular the unique provisions of the U.S.-Peru FTA. It also
includes proposals for more positive engagement of civil society through a
citizen submission process designed to deflect government hostility toward
more collaborative and positive environmental outcomes.
Section VI
concludes that the environmental benefits of trade agreements will continue to
vegetables, and found environmental laws and institutions inadequate to address the
environmental impacts associated with increased economic growth. Moreover, studies have
shown that NAFTA has increased income disparities within Mexico, particularly in rural
communities, and has led to sharp reductions in employment, particularly in the agricultural
sector. As a consequence, economists and others have called for policies that anticipate the
adverse effects of market liberalization. Sandra Polaski, Jobs, Wages, and Household Income, in
NAFTA’S PROMISE AND REALITY, supra, at 11, 12 (concluding that employment in the Mexican
agriculture has “declined sharply” due to NAFTA and the “rural poor have borne the brunt of
adjustment to NAFTA and have been forced to adapt without adequate government support”).
See also J. EDWARD TAYLOR, TRADE INTEGRATION AND RURAL ECONOMIES IN LESS
DEVELOPED COUNTRIES: LESSONS FROM MICRO ECONOMY-WIDE MODELS WITH PARTICULAR
ATTENTION TO MEXICO AND CENTRAL AMERICA 1 (2002) (concluding that “high transaction
costs and lack of access to capital and new product markets exclude poor rural households from
many benefits of trade liberalization and may exacerbate poverty in the wake of trade reforms”).
26. U.S.-Peru FTA, supra note 22, Annex 18.3.4, ¶¶ 3(a), (g). For more on the
environmental provisions of U.S.-Peru FTA, see infra Section V.B.
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be small if the United States continues to use the NAAEC as a model.
Nonetheless, a focus on scale effects could be fashioned from existing efforts
implemented under the environmental cooperative work programs, with the
important caveat that much of these efforts must occur prior to implementation
of the FTA, not after it.
II. THE DEVELOPMENT OF ENVIRONMENT PROVISIONS IN THE NAAEC
Not only did the Tuna/Dolphin dispute awaken environmentalists to the
potential environmental effects of trade liberalization, but it also spawned a
critical analysis of trade-environment linkages. These linkages became central
to the debate over how to integrate environmental protection into NAFTA and
helped to shape the institutions incorporated into the NAAEC. Section A
describes the different environmental effects of trade—regulatory,
competitiveness and scale effects. Section B briefly summarizes the NAFTA
negotiations before Section C describes how NAFTA’s anticipated effects
shaped the provisions and institutions of the NAAEC.
A.

The Environmental Effects of Trade Liberalization

Regulatory effects “concern the way international trade law restrains
government policy choices and substantially impairs the regulatory authority of
governments to protect national health and the environment and to secure
effective protection of the global environment.”27 In the absence of
environmental provisions in an FTA, international trade rules may, in fact,
limit national, or even international, regulatory options for protection of the
national environment.28 The Tuna/Dolphin dispute, in which a GATT panel
ruled that U.S. efforts to limit its market to tuna caught using specific
“dolphin-friendly” techniques violated GATT rules, is an example of
regulatory effects. According to environmentalists, such regulatory effects
undermine environmental protection because trade restrictions should be
available as a regulatory policy tool “as leverage to promote worldwide
environmental protection, particularly to address global or transboundary
environmental problems and to reinforce environmental agreements.”29
Environmentalists have been able to use the Tuna/Dolphin dispute and a small
number of other high profile international trade challenges to environmental

27. CHRIS WOLD, SANFORD GAINES & GREG BLOCK, TRADE AND THE ENVIRONMENT: LAW
7 (2005).
28. Id. See also, DANIEL C. ESTY, GREENING THE GATT: TRADE, ENVIRONMENT, AND THE
FUTURE 42 (1992) (stating that trade agreements “can be used to override environmental
regulations unless appropriate environmental provisions are built into the structure of the trade
system”).
29. ESTY, supra note 28, at 42.
AND POLICY
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laws to press for provisions in FTAs to reduce regulatory effects.30 On the
other hand, free trade proponents argue that trade agreements have a positive
regulatory effect “by helping eliminate environmentally harmful subsidies and
by facilitating transfer of pollution control technology.”31 Moreover, trade
restrictions, especially unilateral ones, “often impose unfair economic burdens
for environmental protection on developing countries.”32
While regulatory effects played an important role in triggering the NAAEC
negotiations, the NAAEC is actually silent on the issue. In contrast,
competitiveness effects have a much more prominent role in the NAAEC.
Competitiveness effects “concern differences across countries in their national
environmental standards and whether those differences impair the ability of
firms in high-standards countries to compete with firms in low-standard
countries.”33 According to some environmentalists, “[e]ven if the pollution
they cause does not spill over onto other nations, countries with lax
environmental standards may have a competitive advantage in the global
marketplace and put pressure on countries with high environmental standards
to reduce the rigor of their environmental requirements.”34 This is known as
the “race to the bottom.” In addition, environmentalists worry that investment
will flow to areas with low environmental standards or weak enforcement of
environmental standards, creating “pollution havens.” For trade proponents,
however, competitiveness effects are not a legitimate argument against
liberalized trade because differences in national environmental standards are
30. A review of these cases yields decidedly mixed results as to whether trade law prevented
the accomplishment of the environmental objective. In Tuna/Dolphin, for example, the United
States did in fact impose discriminatory measures on Mexican fishermen that were unnecessary
from an environmental perspective. Although Mexican fishermen could kill 25% more dolphins
than U.S. fishermen in the Eastern Tropical Pacific yellowfin tuna fishery, they could kill only
25% more than the number of dolphins actually killed by U.S. fishermen. Thus, the fishermen
cannot know until the end of the season whether their dolphin mortality was consistent with U.S.
restrictions. Imposing a quota would have been a much more sensible approach from a trade
perspective and an environmental perspective, provided that the quota bore some relationship to
dolphin needs. In United States—Reformulated Gasoline, the U.S. Congress prevented the EPA
from implementing nondiscriminatory rules for ascertaining pollutant levels in domestic and
foreign gasoline. Congress directed the EPA to impose stricter requirements on foreign
producers. Naturally, a WTO panel found these discriminatory requirements inconsistent with
Article III of the General Agreement on Tariffs and Trade, which requires WTO members to treat
imported products “no less favorably” than domestic products. Panel Report, United States—
Standards for Reformulated and Conventional Gasoline Report of the Panel, WT/DS2/R (Jan. 29,
1996), (adopted May 20, 1996), reprinted in 35 I.L.M. 276 (1996).
31. See Jagdish Bhagwati, Trade and Environment: The False Conflict?, in TRADE AND THE
ENVIRONMENT: LAW, ECONOMICS, AND POLICY 159, 162–163 (Durwood Zaelke et al., eds.,
1993).
32. Id.
33. WOLD, GAINES & BLOCK, supra note 27, at 7.
34. Id.
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justified as an expression of a country’s environmental conditions and its
priorities and preferences.35 For example, while Americans may prefer
conservation of dolphins and other marine mammals, regardless of their
conservation status, others may view them as a culturally important food
source.
Despite the arguments of free trade proponents, competitiveness and
enforcement concerns played a central role in framing the NAFTA and
NAAEC negotiations because of the presence of maquiladoras along the U.SMexico border. At the time of these negotiations, it was widely acknowledged
that maquiladoras36 on the Mexican side of the U.S.-Mexico border had caused
extraordinary pollution. While it cannot be said that maquiladoras polluted the
entire border region,37 they had turned some areas into “a virtual cesspool and
breeding ground for infectious diseases.”38 Because the maquiladoras operated
consistently with free trade principles—they are allowed to import tariff-free
raw materials and export finished products without paying export tariffs39—

35. Bhagwati, supra note 31, at 166–67.
36. “Maquiladoras” are a creation of Mexican law. They may be jointly owned by foreign
and Mexican corporations, wholly-owned Mexican firms, or wholly-owned subsidiaries of
foreign firms—Japanese, Korean, Dutch, etc., as well as U.S. or Canadian companies. Originally,
maquiladoras needed to be located along the 2,000-mile United States-Mexico border, but that
requirement was eliminated many years ago. Maquiladoras can now be found in many interior
locations in Mexico. Under Mexican law, these factories may import raw materials or
components tariff-free from U.S. and other suppliers. In many cases, these semi-finished products
may be shipped back to other countries, such as the United States, for sale, again tariff-free. One
Mexican business website describes a maquiladora as follows:
A maquila program entitles the company, first, to foreign investment participation in the
capital—and in management—of up to 100% without need of any special authorization;
second, it entitles the company to special customs treatment, allowing duty free temporary
import of machinery, equipment, parts and materials, and administrative equipment such
as computers, and communications devices, subject only to posting a bond guaranteeing
that such goods will not remain in Mexico permanently.
Mexico Data On-Line, What is a Maquiladora? Manufacturing In Mexico: The Mexican In-Bond
(Maquila) Program, Feb. 16, 2007, http://www.mexconnect.com/business/mex2000maquiladora
2.html.
37. That maquiladoras have created substantial local air and water pollution and
contamination of soil with hazardous wastes is undisputed, but this pollution has occurred largely
in urban areas. It is inaccurate to say, as some have, that the maquiladoras have contaminated the
entire border region. After all, the border region includes Big Bend National Park (in Texas) in
addition to many state parks and vast, unpopulated areas of desert and mountains.
38. Michael Satchell, Poisoning the Border, U.S. NEWS & WORLD REPORT, May 6, 1991, at
32, 34 (quoting American Medical Association report). See also Knox & Markell, supra note 13,
at 3 (noting that “the maquiladoras had overwhelmed local facilities for providing clean water
and treating waste”).
39. For example, wastes generated by maquiladora facilities from raw materials imported
in-bond from the United States are considered to be U.S.-generated and must be “exported” back
to the United States for disposal. Agreement Between the United States of America and the
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these serious environmental impacts became a central NAFTA negotiation
issue. Indeed, environmentalists capitalized on this point to argue that NAFTA
would lead to additional pollution havens in Mexico, that Mexico already had
weak environmental laws and would use those laws to attract businesses from
Canada and the United States, and, more generally, that NAFTA’s trade
liberalizing effects would increase the depletion of natural resources in North
America by reducing costs of production.40
Due to this criticism, the United States undertook an analysis of Mexico’s
environmental laws. On closer inspection, Mexico, it was learned, had
environmental standards equivalent to, and in some circumstances stricter than,
U.S. standards.41 What accounted then for the deplorable conditions near
many maquiladoras? According to another analysis, Mexico’s enforcement of
environmental laws was weak and crippled by inadequate allocation of
resources.42 As a consequence, environmental enforcement became a major
focus of the NAAEC.
The allure of the high-profile Tuna/Dolphin and maquiladora issues
caused scale and composition effects to receive much less attention in the
NAFTA/NAAEC negotiations.43 Scale and composition effects “concern the
growing scale of international trade and the composition of that trade, that is,

United Mexican States on Cooperation for the Protection and Improvement of the Environment in
the Border Area, U.S.-Mex., Annex III, Aug. 14, 1983 [hereinafter La Paz Agreement], available
at http://www.epa.gov/Border2012/docs/LaPazAgreement.pdf. See also Sanford Gaines, Bridges
to a Better Environment: Building Cross-Border Institutions for Environmental Improvement in
the U.S.-Mexico Border Area, 12 ARIZ. J. INT’L & COMP. L. 429, 443 n.55 (1995).
40. For a history of the involvement of nongovernmental organizations in the negotiation of
NAFTA and the NAAEC, including criticisms of trade liberalization, see PIERRE MARC JOHNSON
& ANDRÉ BEAULIEU, THE ENVIRONMENT AND NAFTA: UNDERSTANDING AND IMPLEMENTING
THE NEW CONTINENTAL LAW 24–34 (1996). See also Kal Raustiala, The Political Implications
of the Enforcement Provisions of the NAFTA Environmental Side Agreement: The CEC as a
Model for Future Accords, 25 ENVTL. L. 31 (1995).
41. The U.S. Government Accounting Office concluded that “Mexico’s laws and regulations
are in many respects comparable to U.S. laws and regulations and in some cases are even
stricter.” U.S. GOVT ACCOUNTING OFFICE, GAO/GGD-93-137, NORTH AMERICAN FREE TRADE
AGREEMENT: ASSESSMENT OF MAJOR ISSUES, 115 (1993). See also U.S. GOVT ACCOUNTING
OFFICE, GAO/NSIAD-91-227, U.S.-MEXICO TRADE: INFORMATION ON ENVIRONMENTAL
REGULATIONS AND ENFORCEMENT (1991) (finding enforcement of Mexican environmental laws
to be weak).
42. U.S. GOVT ACCOUNTING OFFICE, GAO/GGD-92-113, U.S.-MEXICO TRADE:
ASSESSMENT OF MEXICO’S ENVIRONMENTAL CONTROLS FOR NEW COMPANIES (1992).
43. Scale and compositional effects were by no means ignored. The environmental review
of NAFTA, for example, identified species loss and other possible effects of NAFTA.
INTERAGENCY TASK FORCE COORDINATED BY THE OFFICE OF THE UNITED STATES TRADE
REPRESENTATIVE, REVIEW OF U.S.-MEXICO ENVIRONMENTAL ISSUES (1992) (analyzing the
effects of the potential NAFTA on the environment in both Mexico and the United States).
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the particular mix of goods being traded.”44 Although economists often
consider scale and composition as two separate factors, each raises the
question of sustainability and the size of the economy or specific economic
sectors:
The overall scale of world economic activity raises significant challenges for
all elements of environmental protection, from resource conservation to
pollution control, and a substantial and growing fraction of that activity
involves international trade. By the same token, the composition of trade
significantly determines its environmental consequences. For example, trade
in fish and in agricultural products has a bearing on fishing effort and land-use
practices around the world. Trade in lumber and pulp and paper affects forest
conservation and forest management in many countries. As two prominent
economists once remarked, “While many nice things can be said about
liberalizing and thus increasing trade, the structure of trade, as we know it at
45
present, is a curse from the perspective of sustainable development.”

For environmentalists, “[w]ithout environmental safeguards, trade may
cause environmental harm by promoting economic growth that results in the
unsustainable consumption of natural resources and waste production.”46
While this criticism could apply to any kind of growth, not just trade-related
growth, trade-based economic growth poses unique problems. As described
more fully in Section IV.A.2, lowering trade barriers allows a rush of
economic activity and quick exploitation of natural resources before illequipped regulatory bodies can adapt regulations and other infrastructure to the
new circumstances. In such circumstances, any benefits from trade-led
economic growth are outweighed by environmental harm.47 For free trade
proponents, such as Jagdish Bhagwati,48 even though freer trade may lead to
economic growth, growth can improve environmental conditions by altering
social preferences for environmental protection and increasing economic
resources available to spend on environmental enhancement measures.

44. WOLD, GAINES & BLOCK, supra note 27, at 6.
45. Id. at 6–7. (citing T. Haavelmo & S. Hansen, On the Strategy of Trying to Reduce
Economic Inequality by Expanding the Scale of Human Activity, in ENVIRONMENTALLY
SUSTAINABLE ECONOMIC DEVELOPMENT: BUILDING ON BRUNDTLAND at 27, 34. (R. Goodland
et al., eds., World Bank, 1991).
46. ESTY, supra note 28, at 42. Professor Esty did not necessarily advocate this point of
view, but he was perhaps the first to analyze trade-environment linkages in a sophisticated way.
As part of that analysis, he succinctly summarized the main arguments of environmentalists and
free trade proponents. See also WOLD, GAINES & BLOCK, supra note 27, at 5–8; Greg Block,
Trade and Environment in the Western Hemisphere: Expanding the North American Agreement
on Environmental Cooperation into the Americas, 33 ENVTL. L. 501, 511–12 (2003).
47. See infra notes 114–123 and accompanying text..
48. Bhagwati, supra note 31, at 159.
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The NAFTA/NAAEC Negotiations

The negotiations to incorporate environmental provisions in NAFTA
began with President George H. W. Bush. After reports concluded that
Mexico allocated inadequate funds toward enforcement of its environmental
standards, environmentalists and the U.S. government made a number of
proposals to address enforcement concerns. Consistent with the standard
remedy in trade disputes, most of these proposals included some form of trade
sanctions for failures to enforce environmental law.49 Many environmentalists
also advocated for a powerful commission that could monitor and enforce
environmental regulations of all three Parties and investigate allegations of
noncompliance with environmental law brought to the commission’s attention
by governments or citizens.50 Others sought a less robust commission that
would instead provide a neutral forum for cooperation and coordination of
environmental issues by the three Parties, facilitating implementation of
NAFTA’s environmental provisions and ensuring public participation.51 These
differences of opinion deeply split the environmental community, with a
coalition of twenty-three environmental groups ultimately criticizing the
approach of President Bush.52 When Bill Clinton became president, the
NAFTA negotiations had already been completed, but Congress had not yet
adopted it. To win the support of environmentalists, he embarked on a more
aggressive approach than the Bush administration.
Nevertheless, Mexico and Canada were not willing partners in these
negotiations, and they certainly did not embrace reopening NAFTA itself or
any of the options that included trade restrictions.53 That left the U.S.

49. For a thorough history of the NAFTA and NAAEC negotiations, see Robert F. Housman
& Paul M. Orbuch, Integrating Labor and Environmental Concerns into the North American
Free Trade Agreement: A Look Back and a Look Ahead, 8 AM. U. J. INT’L L. & POL’Y 719
(1993). See also Steve Charnovitz, The NAFTA Environmental Side Agreement: Implications for
Environmental Cooperation, Trade Policy, and American Treatymaking, 8 TEMP. INT’L & COMP.
L.J. 257, 257–259 (1994); Knox & Markell, supra note 13, at 3–9.
50. Letter from CIEL to Assistant Secretary of State for Oceans, International Environment
& Scientific Affairs, Curtis Bohlen, (Nov. 18, 1992); Housman & Orbuch, supra note 49, at 791
(citing Letter from John Audley, Sierra Club, to Sanford Gaines, the Assistant U.S. Trade
Representative (Oct. 16, 1992)). The Housman and Orbuch article provides an excellent history
of the environmental negotiations.
51. Housman & Orbuch, supra note 49, 791–92 (citing Letter from USTR Carla Hills to Jay
Hair, President, National Wildlife Federation (Sept. 29, 1992)).
52. Id. at 792 (noting that the organizations complained that the Administration’s proposed
Commission, as summarized by Housman and Orbuch, “would have too limited a scope, no
enforcement powers, inadequate funding, and few, if any avenues for public participation either
in the negotiations or in the procedures of the [commission] itself”).
53. See, e.g., Robert Housman, Paul Orbuch, & William Snape, Enforcement of
Environmental Laws Under a Supplemental Agreement to the North American Free Trade
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administration in the middle, trying to appease U.S. environmental
organizations while also trying to reach agreement with its NAFTA partners.
In the end, Mexico and Canada conceded that some agreement relating to the
environment was necessary to bring NAFTA’s trade-liberalizing provisions
into force. Similarly, the United States realized that it could not push Mexico
and Canada too far and that some middle ground was necessary. These
tensions gave rise to the NAAEC, a freestanding agreement separate from
NAFTA.
C. The NAAEC’s Environmental Provisions
Despite the compromises needed to resolve tensions between the
negotiating Parties, the NAAEC had the potential to transform the way we
think about trade-environment issues. Its provisions and institutions were
deemed “innovative”54 and even “revolutionary.”55 Rather than focus solely
on the effects of trade liberalization on the environment, the NAAEC includes
a broader environmental mandate within the context of trade negotiations.56 It
pairs U.S. concerns about economic competitiveness with the broader goal of
fostering the improvement of the North American environment.57 It twines
these two goals by seeking to protect and enhance the North American
environment, including in the context of trade,58 through cooperation and

Agreement, 5 GEO. INT’L ENVTL. L. REV. 593, 613–619 (1993) (proposing a sanctions-based
model proposed by the Center for International Environmental Law and Defenders of Wildlife).
54. Chris Wold et al., supra note 17, at 416. See Knox & Markell, supra note 13, at 2.
55. John J. Kirton, Winning Together: The NAFTA Trade-Environment Record, in LINKING
TRADE, ENVIRONMENT, AND SOCIAL COHESION: NAFTA EXPERIENCES, GLOBAL CHALLENGES
73, 74 (John J. Kirton & Virginia W. MacLaren eds., 2002).
56. The NAAEC is almost entirely divorced from trade-related aspects of environmentalism.
Article 10(6) requires the Council to “contribut[e] to the prevention or resolution of environmentrelated trade disputes” and “consider[] on an ongoing basis the environmental effects of the
NAFTA.” NAAEC, supra note 5, art. 10(6).
57. One assessment of the NAAEC, known as the Independent Review Committee (IRC),
described the NAAEC as follows:
The IRC believes it is important to see the NAAEC as a complete agreement in its own
right, and not just as a “side agreement” to a trade deal. In the Committee’s view, the
NAAEC is a critically important element to achieve the goal of sustainable development
in North America. Moreover, the NAAEC is not just a trade and environment agreement
in the technical or legal sense. Rather, the mandate of the CEC, as the Committee
understands it, is more broadly defined as the protection and enhancement of the
environment in North America in the context of changing economic patterns, including
the relevant trade and environment issues. The long term value of the CEC will be
measured by its fulfilment of this mandate.
Independent Review Committee, Four-Year Review of the North American Agreement on
Environmental Cooperation, vii (1998), available at http://www.cec.org.
58. An early review of the NAAEC and the Commission for Environmental Cooperation
specifically called on the CEC to make “trade and environment linkages part of the ‘living
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cooperative environmental programs. The NAAEC identifies a diverse array
of potential cooperation,59 “bound loosely by a broad conception of
environment and, more practically, by the ability of the three countries to reach
consensus on priorities and lines of action in its annual program of work.”60
The NAAEC’s origins in competitiveness concerns arising from weak
enforcement are readily apparent, with each Party committing to ensure that its
laws and regulations provide for “high levels” of environmental protection61
and to “effectively enforce” its environmental laws through appropriate
government action.62 The NAAEC also requires Parties to ensure that
administrative and judicial proceedings are transparent and available63 and that
appropriate sanctions and remedies are provided to compel enforcement with
environmental law.64 It further commits the Parties to ensure that its citizens
have private access to remedies for violations of its environmental laws and
regulations, and that persons with a “legally recognized interest” have access
to courts and administrative bodies for the enforcement of a Party’s

program’ of the CEC” by defining its trade-environment mandate to include “exploiting trade
opportunities for environmental improvement and to ensuring that trade-related growth,
particularly growth in production, does not impair the environment of any country.” Id. at xi, 6.
59. Article 10(2), for example, sets forth a nonexhaustive list of nineteen possible areas for
the Parties to consider and develop recommendations, including: comparability of techniques and
methodologies for data gathering and analysis; pollution prevention techniques and strategies;
approaches and common indicators for reporting on the state of the environment; transboundary
and border environmental issues; exotic species that may be harmful; the protection of threatened
and endangered species; environmental matters as they relate to economic development;
ecologically sensitive national accounts; ecolabeling; and “other matters as it may decide.”
NAAEC, supra note 5, art. 10(2).
60. WOLD, GAINES & BLOCK, supra note 27, at 793. The overall tone of the NAAEC has
been described as follows:
The NAAEC includes an odd mix of mandatory language (“shalls”) followed by words
that often negate or weaken the obligation. For example, Article 3 requires that each
Party “shall ensure that its laws and regulations provide for high levels of environmental
protection and shall strive to continue to improve those laws and regulations.” Yet,
Article 3 also grants each Party the right to establish its own levels of domestic
environmental protection, and nowhere do the Parties define or establish threshold limits
for “high levels.” Similarly, commitments are often qualified by “appropriate” or are
framed in aspirational language such as “strive for,” “promote,” or “seek to.”
Id.
61. NAAEC, supra note 5, art. 3.
62. Id. art. 5 (noting that “appropriate governmental action” includes, among other things,
appointing and training inspectors, publicly disclosing non-compliance information, promoting
environmental audits, and initiating enforcement proceedings for violations of environmental
law).
63. Id. art. 5(2).
64. Id. art. 5(3).
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environmental laws and regulations.65 Parties must also ensure that such
proceedings are “fair, open, and equitable.”66
1. The NAAEC’s Institutions
To achieve its objectives and help the Parties implement its provisions, the
NAAEC creates the CEC, a trilateral international institution, comprising a
Council, Secretariat and Joint Public Advisory Committee (JPAC). The
Council is the governing body of the CEC, headed by the cabinet-level
environmental official of each country. As part of its duty to serve as a forum
for promoting and facilitating cooperation between the Parties on
environmental matters, the Council adopts a cooperative work program on a
range of issues concerning the North American environment. Except for a few
important exceptions, Council decisions are taken by consensus.67 With an
equal voice in governing its affairs, each NAFTA Party contributes an equal
share to the CEC budget.68
The CEC Secretariat provides technical, administrative and operational
support to the Council. It also possesses some autonomous investigatory and
reporting authority, including the authority to prepare reports on matters within
the scope of the work program.69 The Secretariat’s unit on Submissions on
Enforcement Matters processes citizen submissions on failures to effectively
enforce environmental law and develop “factual records,” when approved by
the Parties.70
The JPAC consists of fifteen individuals—five members from each
country—appointed by the head of state in each country to advise the Parties
on any matter within the scope of the NAAEC, to comment on the Secretariat’s
work plan and to consult with the public in open meetings on aspects of the

65. Id. art. 6.
66. NAAEC, supra note 5, art. 7.
67. The Council meets at least once a year in regular sessions which must include a public
meeting. Id. art. 9(3).
In practice, these meetings routinely draw hundreds of stakeholders from the region and
provide, among other things, an important opportunity for NGOs to establish and fortify
regional networks on issues of regional concern. Council-appointed “alternative
representatives,” government working groups, and several committees meet much more
frequently throughout the year to address a wide array of issues ranging from
implementation plans to voting on factual records.
WOLD, GAINES & BLOCK, supra note 27, at 794.
68. NAAEC, supra note 5, art. 43.
69. Id. art. 13(1). The Secretariat may also prepare reports on other matters, but it must
notify the Council, which must approve the request by a two-thirds vote. Id.
70. Id. arts. 14–15. The Council must approve the preparation of a factual record by a twothirds vote. Id. art. 15(2).
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As noted by Professor John Wirth, a former JPAC

Not surprisingly, there has been friction at times between nongovernmental
JPAC members and the deputy ministers and other federal officials who staff
the Council, particularly over the rules and procedures for addressing citizen
complaints over nonenforcement of environmental laws. In fact, a certain
creative tension is built right into the JPAC’s role. In the nearly eight years
since it was constituted in 1994, JPAC has become an effective, visible and
respected branch of the CEC. It continues to evolve as the CEC itself evolves
72
as an institution.

According to Professor Wirth, the JPAC has been successful, in part, due to its
early decision to eschew national identities, instead choosing “to interact as
North Americans rather than . . . as advocates or defenders of national
positions or as representatives of any particular private voluntary organization
or interest group.”73 This comment has particular resonance given the trend in
subsequent FTAs to consolidate decisionmaking within governments.
2. The NAAEC’s Enforcement Provisions
Two mechanisms underscore the NAAEC’s emphasis on enforcement and
competitiveness concerns. The NAAEC creates a procedure that allows a
complaining Party to seek the imposition of a monetary assessment if a Party is
found by a tribunal to have engaged in a “persistent pattern” of failure to
enforce environmental law with potential competitiveness effects in the
NAFTA region.74 In addition, it establishes a citizen submission process that
provides an avenue for groups or individuals to allege that a Party is failing to
effectively enforce its environmental laws.75 These mechanisms constitute the
NAAEC’s “teeth” in what otherwise would be solely a forum for regional
environmental cooperation.
a. The Government Sanctions Process
A Party initiates the “sanctions” process by requesting consultation to
determine whether another Party is engaging in a “persistent pattern of failure
to effectively enforce its environmental law,”76 defined as “a sustained or
recurring course of action or inaction beginning after the date of entry into

71. Id. art. 16.
72. John D. Wirth, Perspectives on the Joint Public Advisory Committee, in GREENING
NAFTA, supra note 13, at 199.
73. Id. at 201.
74. NAAEC, supra note 5, arts. 22–36.
75. Id. arts. 14–15.
76. Id. art. 22.
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force of this agreement.”77 When these consultations fail to resolve the matter
and the dispute concerns trade between the Parties, the Council may upon a
two-thirds vote convene an arbitral panel to prepare a report with
recommendations for better enforcement.78 If the panel finds a persistent
failure to enforce environmental law by a Party, the disputing Parties “may”
agree on a “mutually satisfactory action plan, which normally shall conform to
the determinations and recommendations of the panel.”79 If the Parties cannot
agree on a plan or there is disagreement over implementation of a plan, any
disputing Party may petition to reconvene the panel, which may impose a plan
on the Parties.80 If the panel concludes that a Party is not fully implementing
the plan, it may impose a monetary penalty not to exceed .007% of total trade
between the Parties.81 If a Party fails to pay, the other Party in the dispute may
suspend NAFTA benefits in an amount not to exceed the monetary
assessment.82
The process includes an odd twist: instead of paying damages to the Party
harmed by the failure to enforce, the Party failing to enforce its environmental
law ultimately receives the penalty money. After the Party pays the penalty to
CEC,83 the Council expends the money “to improve or enhance the
environment or environmental law enforcement in the Party complained
against.”84
To date, no Party has initiated consultations or even threatened to do so.
Nonetheless:
[T]he sanctions provisions cast a long shadow over the cooperative nature of
the NAAEC and arguably have made the Parties hypersensitive to the citizen
submission procedure for fear that an issue raised by a citizen could later
become the subject of the more consequential governmental sanctions process.
Ironically, this has become the most visible provision in the U.S. government’s
FTAA negotiations, even as many of the NGOs who supported the idea have
quietly distanced themselves from sanctions, instead calling for greater
incentive-based mechanisms to improve environmental protection and
85
enforcement in developing countries.

77.
78.
79.
80.
81.
82.
83.
84.
85.

Id. art. 45.
Id. art. 24.
NAAEC, supra note 5, art. 33.
Id. art. 34.
Id. art. 34(5), Annex 34.
Id. art. 36.
Id. Annex 34.3.
NAAEC, supra note 5, Annex 34.3.
WOLD, GAINES & BLOCK, supra note 27, at 796.
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b. The Citizen Submission Process
The NAAEC allows nongovernmental organizations or individuals to file
submissions with the Secretariat alleging that Canada, Mexico or the United
States “is failing to effectively enforce its environmental law.”86 Assuming
that the submitter meets some basic eligibility requirements,87 the Secretariat
has discretion to request a response to the submission from the Party “against”
whom the submission is directed. If the Secretariat believes that a response is
unnecessary, the matter is closed; the submitter cannot appeal this decision. In
deciding whether a Party should prepare a response, the Secretariat considers
whether the submission alleges harm to the person or organization making the
submission; whether the submission, alone or in combination with other
submissions, raises matters whose further study in this process would advance
the goals of the NAAEC; whether private remedies available under the Party’s
law have been pursued;88 and whether the submission is drawn exclusively
from mass media reports.89

86. NAAEC, supra note 5, art. 14(1).
87. The submitter, who must be a person or organization from one of the three NAAEC
Parties, must provide sufficient information to allow the Secretariat to review the submission,
demonstrate that it has communicated in writing with the relevant authorities concerning the
matter of the petition, indicate the Party’s response, if any, write the submission in the language
specified by that Party, clearly identify the organization or person submitting the petition, and aim
the submission at enforcement—not at harassment—of industry. The Secretariat has discretion to
reject the submission for failing to meet any of these requirements. The submitter has no
mechanism to appeal the decision of the Secretariat. Id.
88. The NAAEC does not explicitly require a submitter to first pursue private remedies
before a petition might be accepted for purposes of Article 14; it is merely something about which
the defending Party may advise the Secretariat. The Secretariat, however, has refused to consider
a submission because the submitters had not “diligently pursu[ed] local remedies between the
time of the government’s adoption and implementation of [the law] and the date the submission
was filed.” Commission for Environmental Cooperation, Determination pursuant to Articles 14
& 15 of the North American Agreement on Environmental Cooperation, at 3, A14/SEM/97004/03/14(1) (May 26, 1997), available at http://www.cec.org/files/pdf/sem/97-4-DET-E.pdf.
89. NAAEC, supra note 5, art. 14(2), at 1488. In one of the first Article 14 petitions, the
Secretariat concluded that the burden to show harm is substantially less for Article 14 petitions
than for civil actions in many countries. Mexico, the responding Party, argued that submitters did
not adequately allege harm to the members of their organizations. Nonetheless, the Secretariat
ruled that the submitters met their burden:
In considering harm, the Secretariat notes the importance and character of the resource in
question—a portion of the magnificent Paradise corral reef located in the Caribbean
waters of Quintana Roo. While the Secretariat recognizes that the submitters may not
have alleged the particularized, individual harm required to acquire legal standing to bring
suit in some civil proceedings in North America, the especially public nature of marine
resources bring the submitters within the spirit and intent of Article 14 of the NAAEC.
Commission for Environmental Cooperation, Recommendation of the Secretariat to Council for
the Development of a Factual Record in accordance with Articles 14 and 15 of the North
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If the Secretariat determines that a response from the “defendant” Party is
necessary, the Party has thirty days to respond.90 If the Party chooses to
respond, it should state whether the matter is or was the subject of pending
judicial or administrative proceedings, and whether private remedies are
available.91 Although the NAAEC only requires termination of a submission
when a pending judicial or administrative proceeding has been initiated by the
government, the Secretariat has refused to request permission from the Council
to develop a factual record even when nongovernmental organizations have
initiated proceedings concerning the same subject matter as the submission.92
The Secretariat has discretion to request authorization from the Council to
prepare a factual record upon receiving a response from the Party.93 Again, the
Secretariat may determine that the response is sufficient and end the matter
with no chance for the submitter to appeal. Nonetheless, if the Secretariat
recommends to the Council that a factual record is warranted, the Council must
approve the Secretariat’s recommendation by a two-thirds vote.94 If the
Council approves the recommendation to develop a factual record, the
Secretariat may consider information that is publicly available or information
submitted to it by interested persons, NGOs or the JPAC.95 The Secretariat
does not have the authority, however, to subpoena documents.96 The factual

American Agreement on Environmental Cooperation (Cozumel), at 5, A14/SEM/96-001/07/ADV
(June 7, 1996), available at http://www.cec.org/files/pdf/sem/96-1-ADV-E.pdf.
90. NAAEC, supra note 5, art. 14(3).
91. Id. The NAAEC defines “judicial or administrative proceeding” as “a domestic judicial,
quasi-judicial or administrative action pursued by the Party.” Id. art. 45(3) (emphasis added).
92. See Commission for Environmental Cooperation, Determination pursuant to Articles 14
& 15 of the North American Agreement on Environmental Cooperation (Oldman River I),
A14/SEM/96-003/12/15(1) (Apr. 2, 1997), available at http://www.cec.org/files/pdf/sem/96-3DET-OE3.pdf [hereinafter Oldman River I—Article 15(1) Determination]. Submitters in this
case eventually abandoned the judicial proceedings and re-petitioned to the Secretariat a year
later. The Friends of the Oldman River, North American Agreement on Environmental
Cooperation Article 14 Submission, A14/SEM-97-006/01/SUB (Oct. 4, 1997) available at
http://www.cec.org/files/pdf/sem/97-6-SUB-E.pdf. After reviewing the new submission, this
petition, the Secretariat determined that a response from the Party was warranted. Commission
for Environmental Cooperation, Article 15(1) Notification to Council that Development of a
Factual Record is Warranted (Oldman River II), A14/SEM-97-006/15/ADV (July 19, 1999),
available at http://www.cec.org/ files/pdf/sem/97-6-ADV-E.pdf.
93. NAAEC, supra note 5, art. 15(1).
94. Id. art. 15(2).
95. Id. art. 15(4).
96. The Secretariat must submit a draft factual record to the Council. Any Party has fortyfive days to comment on the accuracy of the draft. Neither the Council nor the Secretariat is
under an obligation to make the draft public, and the NAAEC does not expressly grant interested
persons or NGOs the right to comment on the draft. The Secretariat must incorporate any
comments of the Parties in the final factual record and submit it to the Council. The Council, by
a two-thirds vote, may make public the factual record. Id. arts. 15(5) and (6).
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record does not indicate whether there has been a failure to enforce
environmental law or suggest ways that enforcement could be improved.
Instead, by describing the facts of a submission and the government’s
response, the factual record shines a light on government action, which readers
are free to interpret.
3. The Secretariat’s Independent Functions
In addition to managing the citizen submission process, including the
discretion to make various findings without Council oversight, the Secretariat
also has independent authority to prepare reports—known as Article 13
reports—on environmental matters unrelated to enforcement issues.97 If the
report is included within the annual work program of the CEC, then the
Secretariat does not need to seek Council approval before initiating its report.
The Secretariat may also prepare reports “related to the cooperative functions”
of the NAAEC unless the Council objects by a two-thirds vote.98 At the time
of the NAAEC negotiations, the Parties understood Article 13 as granting the
Secretariat authority “to exercise its own professional judgment independent of
the Council and the Parties.”99
III. THE SUCCESSES AND FAILURES OF THE NAAEC
The CEC and its constituent bodies—the Council, JPAC and Secretariat—
present an interesting and unique model for international institutions in areas
touching on governance, accountability and transparency. While a
governmental decisionmaking body is the norm in international institutions, a
secretariat with limited independent authority and a citizen advisory body is
unusual—convention secretariats generally provide only administrative
support to governments. An international agreement with a citizen advisory

97. Id. art. 13.
98. NAAEC, supra note 5, art. 13(1).
99. David A. Wirth, The North American Commission for Environmental Cooperation’s
Implementation of Article 13 of the North American Agreement on Environmental Cooperation
(2005) (report prepared for North American Commission for Environmental Cooperation). John
Knox, who was involved in the negotiations as an official with the Department of State, has
written that the NAAEC “requires the Secretariat” to implement Article 13 “with little Council
oversight.” Knox & Markell, supra note 13, at 12. Another person involved in the negotiations
with the Environmental Protection Agency, Dan Magraw, concurred, noting that the “secretariat
will have strong elements of independence” and that Article 13 involves “reporting on different
types of topics . . . by the independent secretariat. Daniel Magraw, NAFTA’s Repercussions: Is
Green Trade Possible?, 36 ENVIRONMENT 14, 20 (Mar. 1994).
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body like the JPAC100 and a citizen submission process101 are clearly the
exception, not the rule.
Because of these innovations and its birth within the context of the
NAFTA negotiations, the NAAEC has been subject to a number of reviews,
including two contracted by the Parties themselves.102 There is little doubt that
the CEC has helped create a North American environmental agenda. At the
same time, it is clear that the structural flaws of the NAAEC have prevented it
from achieving a number of its goals. As a consequence, the CEC has
struggled to meet the expectations arising from its unique structure and highprofile origins while also balancing its roles as regional facilitator, convener,
statistician and watchdog.103
A.

The Environmental Effects of Trade

The NAAEC has been particularly important for improving our
understanding of the effects of trade on the environment. Not only has the
CEC developed models for assessing those effects,104 but it also has broadened
our understanding of how to pursue trade-environment linkages. Nonetheless,
the full scope of effects could not be ascertained because, the CEC concluded,
the “lack of high-quality environmental data hampers analysis of tradeenvironment linkages.”105 Significantly, this data is needed prior to adoption
of an FTA in order to accurately assess the impacts of trade on the
environment.

100. While international environmental agreements usually allow citizens to attend meetings
of the parties as “observers” and may make interventions during the course of the meeting, they
do not have a formal advisory capacity as the JPAC does.
101. The World Bank and other multilateral development banks also have citizen submission
processes.
102. The two reviews commissioned by the Parties are Ten-Year Review Committee, Ten
Years of the North American Agreement on Environmental Cooperation (June 15, 2004)
[hereinafter TRAC] and Independent Review Committee, supra note 57. Among the other
reviews, see Greg Block, supra note 46 and Mary E. Kelly & Cyrus Reed, The CEC’s Trade and
Environment Program: Cutting-Edge Analysis but Untapped Potential, in GREENING NAFTA,
supra note 13, at 101. See generally GREENING NAFTA, supra note 13.
103. See WOLD, GAINES & BLOCK, supra note 27, at 795.
104. The CEC has concluded that “no single or ‘best’ assessment method exists, and that a
range of different approaches, models, indicators and means of building meaningful correlations
between free trade and environmental change ought to be pursued simultaneously. Work thus far
shows a sufficient empirical basis to suggest causality between trade liberalization and trade
expansion, and changes in both environmental quality, and environmental policies.” Scott
Vaughan & Greg Block, CEC Secretariat, Free Trade and the Environment: The Picture Becomes
Clearer 31 (2002).
105. Id. at 26.
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1. Competitiveness Effects
Despite the widespread belief that environmental conditions would worsen
in Mexico as a result of NAFTA, the work of the CEC and others has shown
that trade liberalization does not generally result in competitiveness effects;
that is, liberalized trade does not lead to lax environmental standards, a race to
the bottom, pollution havens or the migration of businesses to countries with
lax environmental standards. In one study of competitiveness effects in the
NAFTA region, researchers used three measures of environmental quality (per
capita sulfur dioxide emissions, per capita toxic chemical releases and state
compliance costs) and found “no evidence that border states altered the manner
in which they determined their levels of environmental protection during the
1990s.”106 In fact, they concluded that environmental conditions in North
America actually improved in the run up to NAFTA’s adoption and continued
thereafter.107 Other studies of the effects of trade liberalization on particular
sectors have also concluded that although differences in environmental
standards “may have been a factor” leading some U.S. companies to relocate to
Mexico, “in general, there is little evidence that large-scale shifts in industrial
investment and relocation to pollution havens have occurred.”108 As these
studies have shown, companies do not migrate to take advantage of lax
environmental standards because environmental compliance costs are, as a
general rule, a small percentage of total operating costs.109
Companies do, in fact, relocate. However, they generally relocate for nonenvironmental reasons, such as market access and lower labor costs. With
respect to relocation to Mexico, the U.S. Office of Technology Assessment
concluded that “the border area, with its low labor costs, proximity to the

106. G. Fredriksson & Daniel L. Millimet, Is There a Race to the Bottom in Environmental
Policies?: The Effects of NAFTA, in CEC, THE ENVIRONMENTAL EFFECTS OF FREE TRADE 241,
245 (2002). See Claudia Schatan, The Environmental Impact of Mexican Manufacturing Exports
under NAFTA, in GREENING NAFTA, supra note 13, at 147 (noting that Mexico increased
foreign trade after NAFTA, but that [t]his increase in foreign trade . . . is not attributable to
Mexico’s becoming a pollution haven” and that “Mexican trade trends do not suggest a shift of
export specialization toward more polluting sectors after 1994”).
107. Fredriksson & Millimet, supra note 106, at 260.
108. U.S. CONGRESSIONAL OFFICE FOR TECHNOLOGY ASSESSMENT, TRADE AND
ENVIRONMENT: CONFLICTS AND OPPORTUNITIES, OTA-BP-ITE-94, 40 (1992) (studying data
concerning the manufacturing sector).
109. In the United States, pollution abatement costs are generally small compared to total
operating costs. For example, pollution abatement costs for the tobacco products industry were
just 0.12% of total costs; for the fabricated metals products, 0.42%; for petroleum and coal
products, 1.93%; and for all industries evaluated, an average of 0.62%. Håkan Nordström &
Scott Vaughan, TRADE AND ENVIRONMENT 37 (WTO Publications 1999), available at
http://www.wto.org/english/news_e/pres99_e/environment.pdf.
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United States, and duty-free export processing zones, has attracted many U.S.
firms over the years.”110
2. Scale Effects
As with competitiveness effects, the CEC has helped to improve our
knowledge of scale effects. Not only has the CEC’s work focused attention on
the type of information needed to evaluate scale effects, but it has also shown,
along with others, important connections between trade and scale effects.
Concerning the type of information needed to evaluate scale effects, the
CEC Secretariat has noted that large-scale, or “macro,” studies of the
environmental effects of trade “are only partially useful.”111 Although they
may show “marginal” overall levels of environmental change at a global,
continental or national level, they are unlikely to identify (and more likely to
mask) environmental impacts in specific geographic locations. As a
consequence, such macro studies must be “supported by more targeted and
disaggregated indicators, including region-specific, environmental-mediaspecific, and sector-specific analysis.”112
These conclusions are extremely significant because even if trade
liberalization has an overall positive environmental impact, it may result in
substantial depletion of specific natural resources, such as fish or timber, or
increases in air or water pollution in particular localities or in specific
economic sectors. For example, NAFTA has led to increased water pollution
from nitrogen loading in areas of intensive farming.113
Concerning actual scale effects, the work of the CEC has shown that the
increased production, resource exploitation, transportation and energy needs
that result from increased trade “pose serious challenges to environmental
infrastructures and policy implementation.”114 Studies have shown, for
example, that in Mexico’s agricultural sector, “scale effects of trade-related
shifts to large-scale agri-business operations have not been offset by improved
technologies or stronger regulations.”115 Overall, data show that in Mexico
“environmental degradation has overwhelmed any benefits from trade-led
economic growth.”116

110. TRADE AND ENVIRONMENT: CONFLICTS AND OPPORTUNITIES, supra note 108, at 8.
111. Vaughan & Block, supra note 104, at 25–26.
112. Id. at 26.
113. Vaughan, supra note 25, at 73.
114. Vaughan & Block, supra note 104, at 26.
115. Id. See Vaughan, supra note 25, at 69–80.
116. Kevin P. Gallagher, Free Trade and the Environment: Mexico, NAFTA, and Beyond, 2
(Interhemispheric Resource Center, Sept. 17, 2004). See CEC Secretariat, supra note 24, at 21–
22, 36 (describing the huge changes in demographics due to liberalization of the agricultural
sector).
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Moreover, contrary to the claims of trade proponents that trade will
increase the demand for higher environmental standards, the CEC has found
“little evidence to support the notion that greater revenues arising from trade
expansion will be moved to bolster the resources of environmental authorities
in order to address trade-related scale effects.”117 In fact, the CEC found that
“the speed with which trade and other kinds of liberalization are proceeding
appear to be overwhelming the capacity of domestic regulators generally (in
the financial as well as environmental spheres) to ensure robust oversight of
the course and consequences of changes markets.”118 Between 1988 and 1999,
the period just before NAFTA when Mexico was liberalizing its markets and
through the early years of NAFTA, Mexico’s GDP grew by thirty-eight
percent.119 Nonetheless:
rural soil erosion grew by 89 percent, municipal waste solid waste by 108
percent, water pollution by 29 percent, and air pollution by 97 percent.
Disaggregating air pollution, sulfur dioxide grew by 42 percent, nitrous oxides
by 65 percent, hydrocarbons by 104 percent, carbon monoxide by 105 percent,
120
and particulate matter by 43 percent.

These conclusions do not appear to be unique to NAFTA. Instead, a
consensus is building that “increased trade and growth without appropriate
environmental policies in place may have unwanted effects on the
environment.”121
The importance of these conclusions from the NAFTA and NAAEC
experience for future FTAs is clear: comprehensive and far-reaching
environmental and development objectives “must be conceived of, and
implemented, before agreeing to” liberalize trade.122 Moreover, without
substantial assistance, developing countries are unlikely to “develop the
necessary environmental policies to steer trade-led growth in a sustainable
manner.”123
3. Failures to Integrate Trade and Environmental Policies
The CEC has made clear progress in assessing the scale effects of free
trade and articulating the rationale for ensuring that adequate policies are in
place for anticipating and preventing such impacts. Nevertheless, governments

117. Vaughan & Block, supra note 104, at 26.
118. Id.
119. Kevin P. Gallagher, The CEC and Environmental Quality: Assessing the Mexican
Experience, in GREENING NAFTA, supra note 13, at 117, 119.
120. Id.
121. PER FREDRIKSSON, TRADE, GLOBAL POLICY, AND THE ENVIRONMENT 1 (1999).
122. Block, supra note 46, at 526.
123. Gallagher, supra note 119, at 125.
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do not appear to be integrating trade and environmental policies as a result of
such assessments.124 According to the CEC:
To date, growth in trade has not been matched by a comparable growth in
environmental protection policies. In some instances, evidence to the contrary
(that environmental expenditures have been reduced in tandem with trade
liberalization) has led to increased environmental stress. This is especially true
in specific instances, such as absolute increases in economic scale and lagging
investments in infrastructure, as well as in monitoring and enforcement.
Among the most important challenges to the trade-environment debate is that
125
of building opportunities for policy integration.

B.

The Cooperative Work Program

The incorporation of environmental considerations into NAFTA and
NAAEC has clearly benefited the environment in both abstract and concrete
ways. Some argue that NAFTA is partially responsible for “the spread of mass
public environmental concern in the three NAFTA countries [which] has
generated a growing demand for and thus a governmental supply of such
regulations.”126 While the United States has not seen more than relatively
minor amendments to environmental law since the entry into force of NAFTA
and NAAEC, Mexican environmentalists report that a citizen submission
alleging the failure to enforce Mexico’s environmental impact assessment law
in the construction of a pier in Cozumel had several environmental benefits,
including the reform of Mexico’s environmental law.127 In addition, the
NAAEC has elevated issues typically thought of as strictly domestic matters,
such as enforcement, to international matters.128
Moreover, the cooperative work program of the CEC has produced a
number of strong environmental outcomes. The CEC’s work on toxic
chemicals has perhaps been the most successful program. Through its North
American Regional Action Plans (NARAPs), the three governments agree on
strategies for managing chemicals. These NARAPs have successfully
eliminated the use of chlordane and DDT,129 two potent pesticides, throughout

124. Id. at 27.
125. Id.
126. John J. Kirton, supra note 55, at 79.
127. Gustavo Alanís Ortega, Public Participation within NAFTA’s Environmental Agreement:
The Mexican Experienced, in LINKING TRADE, ENVIRONMENT, AND SOCIAL COHESION: NAFTA
EXPERIENCES, GLOBAL CHALLENGES 183, 184–185 (John J. Kirton & Virginia W. MacLaren
eds., 2002).
128. John J. Kirton, supra note 55, at 79.
129. CEC North American Working Group for the Sound Management of Chemicals Task
Force on DDT and Chlordane, North American Regional Plan on DDT (June 1997), available at
http://www.cec.org/programs_projects/pollutants_health/smoc/ ddt.cfm?varlan=english.
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North America. The CEC is developing other NARAPS to reduce the impact
of mercury130 and PCBs131 on the environment.
In addition, the CEC has been instrumental in compiling comparable data
from the Canadian, Mexican and U.S. Pollutant Release and Transfer
Registries (PRTR) “to give a North American perspective of the amounts of
chemicals released to the air, water, and land, and transferred off-site for
recycling or other management.”132 While the United States and Canada have
had PRTRs for some time (the Toxics Release Inventory under the U.S.
Emergency Planning and Community Right-to-Know Act133), only recently did
Mexico finally mandate reporting of chemicals stored and released at specified
facilities.
The CEC has also produced the North American Atlas, an online
information tool with maps, data and interactive map layers that allows users to
view environmental issues on a continental scale.134 The atlas offers a
consistent mapping framework for studying environmental issues, such as
conservation planning, renewable energy capacity, pollution and other issues.
Despite these notable successes, the cooperative work program is currently
hampered by a shortage of funds; the CEC’s budget has been locked at $9
million (although declining in real dollars due to inflation and currency
exchange rates) since the CEC’s inception. In fact, a properly funded CEC
could be an important aspect of any effort to address scale effects from tradebased growth or growth more generally.135 Nonetheless, the CEC has
developed an impressive array of successes on a shoestring budget.
C. Enforcement Matters
The citizen submission process, in many ways, was the centerpiece of the
NAAEC. Citizens of any of the three Parties could allege that one of the three
130. CEC North American Implementation Task Force on Mercury, North American Action
Plan on Mercury: Phase II (Mar. 16, 2000), available at http://www.cec.org/programs_projects/
pollutants_health/smoc/pdfs/Hgnarap.pdf
131. CEC PCB Task Force, PCB Regional Action Plan (Dec. 1996), available at
http://www.cec.org/programs_projects/pollutants_health/smoc/pcb.cfm?varlan=english.
132. CEC, Taking Stock: 2004, http://www.cec.org/takingstock/takingstock.cfm?activityId=1
1&varlan=English (last visited Oct. 30, 2008).
133. 42 U.S.C. §§ 11001–11050, §§ 311–312. For more on the toxics release inventory, see
Environmental Protection Agency, What Is the Toxics Release Inventory (TRI) Program?,
http://www.epa.gov/tri/triprogram/whatis.htm (last visited Oct. 30, 2008).
134. Commission for Environmental Cooperation, Mapping North American Environmental
Issues, www.cec.org/naatlas (last visited Oct. 30, 2008).
135. Professor John Knox, for example, has called the CEC, with its “broad scope,
cooperative programs, objective reporting, and reliance on public participation,” as an “important
precedent[] for other national and international institutions devoted to sustainable development.”
John H. Knox, The Judicial Resolution of Conflicts Between Trade and the Environment, 28
HARV. ENVTL. L. REV. 1, 78 (2004).
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governments was failing to enforce environmental law effectively. For
Mexican citizens, where options for redress of environmental matters are rare,
the citizen submission process provided the possibility for bringing
environmental issues to the attention of an international institution.136
The rigorous and professional manner in which the Secretariat has
reviewed submissions137 has been instrumental in ensuring the integrity of the
process. Nonetheless, actions and decisions of the Council have eroded public
confidence in the process,138 leading the former director of the CEC’s unit on
Submissions on Enforcement Matters to declare that the submissions process—
frequently referred to as the “teeth” of the NAAEC—suffers from “tooth
decay.”139 The Council has sought to whittle away at the independence of the
Secretariat by determining the scope of proposed factual records, a role
designated to the Secretariat. In the case of the Migratory Birds submission,
submitters requested that the Secretariat prepare a factual record concerning
the nationwide failure of the United States to enforce the Migratory Bird
Treaty Act (MBTA) against loggers,140 and the Secretariat agreed that such a
136. For a review of actual use of the citizen submission process by citizens, see David L.
Markell, Understanding Citizen Perspectives on Government Decision Making Processes as a
Way to Improve the Administrative State, 36 ENVTL. L. 651 (2006).
137. Wold et al., supra note 17, at 421 (“Scholars, NAAEC review committees, and members
of the public are virtually unanimous in applauding the Secretariat’s rigorous review of
submissions for eligibility and for determination on whether a factual record is warranted.”).
Accord John H. Knox, A New Approach to Compliance with International Environmental Law:
The Submissions Procedure of the NAFTA Environmental Commission, 28 ECOLOGY L. Q. 1, 96–
97 (2001) (stating that the Secretariat “has not shown any particular deference to states’ suggested
interpretations of the [NAAEC] Agreement. Conversely, it has dismissed submissions—even by
major environmental groups—that did not meet the requirements for admissibility. In short, the
Secretariat’s decisions appear to be consistently grounded on carefully reasoned legal
interpretations of the [NAAEC] Agreement rather than on fear of adverse reactions by, or the
desire to carry favor with, either states or submitters.”); Markell, supra note 136, at 693–694
(noting that, although the Secretariat has served as a “vigilant filter,” anecdotal evidence “reflects
confidence in the Secretariat’s neutrality and trust in its performance”). In addition, a review of
the Independent Review Committee concluded that:
The record on the submissions that have been subject to Secretariat decisions to date
appears to show a consistent and well reasoned group of decisions. While observers (and
the Parties) may, and some certainly have, criticized specific decisions, this Committee
has seen nothing to suggest that the decisions of the Secretariat lack proper foundation.”
Independent Review Committee, supra note 57, § 3.3.3.
138. See Letter from Randy L. Christensen, Sierra Legal Defense Fund, to CEC Council
(Mar. 6, 2002), available at http://www.cec.org/files/pdf/JPAC/Sierra_to_Council-BCMining.pdf
(stating that the Council’s actions could “threaten to strip the citizen submission process of its
integrity, utility and legitimacy”).
139. Garver, supra note 17.
140. Migratory Bird Treaty Act (MBTA), 16 U.S.C. §§ 703–712 (2000). The MBTA
implements four international treaties, including agreements with Canada and Mexico, aimed at
protecting migratory birds. Section 703 of the MBTA prohibits any person from killing or
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factual record was warranted.141 The Council, in an arbitrary and unexplained
fashion, decided that the Secretariat could only investigate the failure to
enforce the MBTA with respect to two minor examples (but not examples
provided in which thousands of birds were likely taken) provided by submitters
merely to illustrate a pattern of widespread government conduct. Because the
Migratory Birds submitters found the citizen submission process attractive
“only because of its capacity to investigate the United State’s broad pattern of
nonenforcement of the MBTA,”142 the Council’s decision effectively neutered
the submission.
Further evidence of the Council’s effort to undermine the citizen
submission process and erode the Secretariat’s independence can be found in
the Ontario Logging submission.143 After the Secretariat determined that the
submission contained sufficient information to warrant the development of a
factual record, the Council remanded the submission to the submitters by
deeming the submission as containing insufficient information.144 Submitters
had presented data from computer models estimating that more than 85,000
bird nests would be destroyed by logging operations in violation of Canada’s

“taking” migratory birds, including the destruction of nests, the crushing of eggs and the killing
of nestlings and fledglings, “by any means or in any manner,” unless the U.S. Fish and Wildlife
Service (FWS) issues a valid permit. The United States has never prosecuted a logger or logging
company for a violation of the MBTA, even though it acknowledges that the MBTA has
consistently been violated by persons logging on federal and non-federal land. In fact, the
Director of the FWS has stated that the FWS, the agency responsible for enforcement of the
MBTA, “has had a longstanding, unwritten policy relative to the MBTA that no enforcement or
investigative action should be taken in incidents involving logging operations, that result in the
taking of non-endangered, non-threatened, migratory birds and/or their nests.” Memorandum
from U.S. Fish and Wildlife Service to Service Enforcement Officers, MBTA Enforcement
Policy (Mar. 7, 1996), available at http://www.cec.org.
141. CEC Secretariat, Article 15(1) Notification to Council that Development of a Factual
Record is Warranted, A14/SEM/99-002/11/ADV (Dec. 15, 2000) (SEM 99-002), available at
http://www.cec.org/files/pdf/sem/ACFA30.pdf [hereinafter Migratory Birds—Notification to
Council].
142. Wold et al., supra note 17, at 426. For a discussion of how the factual record might have
differed based on the scope requested by submitters and recommended by the Secretariat, see id.
at 427–429.
143. Submission to the Commission on Environmental Cooperation (Ontario Logging),
A14/SEM/02-001/01/SUB (Feb. 6, 2002) (SEM-02-001) [hereinafter Ontario Logging
Submission].
144. CEC, Council Res. 03-05, CEC, C/C.01/03-02/RES/05/final (Apr. 22, 2003), available
at http://www.cec.org/files/pdf/sem/02-1-RES-E.pdf. The Council questioned the sufficiency
with the use of a statistical model that submitters contend provides the best available information
precisely because the government of Canada has abdicated its enforcement responsibilities by,
among other things, failing to collect the kind of information required to assess the impact of
commercial logging on bird populations protected by the Migratory Bird Treaty Act.
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migratory bird regulations.145 Yet, Council, at Canada’s behest, demanded that
submitters provide data that logging actually destroyed bird nests.146
Even where the Council’s actions do not undermine the Secretariat, they
undermine the citizen submission process. For example, Council has ignored
the advice of the JPAC concerning implementation of the submission
process.147 In perhaps the “most serious current threat to the CEC submission
process,”148 Council has long delayed votes on the preparation of factual
records. For example, more than two and a half years passed before Council
approved the Secretariat’s recommendation to prepare a factual record in CoalFired Power Plants.149 More than three years passed before Council approved
the preparation of a factual record in Lake Chapala II.150 Delays of this nature
obviously dampen public enthusiasm for the submission process151 by
eliminating any possibility to meaningfully redress nonenforcement problems

145. Ontario Logging Submission, supra note 143, at 4–5.
146. See Canada, Response to Submission SEM-02-01, A14/SEM/02-001/12/RSP, 5 (Apr. 11,
2002); Council Resolution 03-05, supra note 144. After the submitters provided additional data,
the Secretariat again determined that the preparation of a factual record was warranted, the
Council agreed, and the Secretariat prepared a factual record. For a history of this dispute, as
well as all decisional documents, including the factual record, see CEC.org, Ontario Logging,
http://www.cec.org/citizen/submissions/details/index.cfm?varlan=english&ID=70.
147. JPAC “may provide advice to the Council on any matter within the scope of this
agreement . . . and on the implementation and further elaboration of this agreement, and may
perform such other functions as the Council may direct.” NAAEC, supra note 5, art. 16(4). For
an example of JPAC advice to Council on the citizen submission process, see Joint Public
Advisory Committee, Advice to Council No. 03-05, Dec. 17, 2003, Re: Limiting the Scope of
Factual Records and Review of the Operation of CEC Council Resolution 00-09 related to
Articles 14 and 15 of the North American Agreement on Environmental Cooperation, available at
http://www.cec.org/files/pdf/ABOUTUS/Advice03-05_EN.pdf
148. Garver, supra note 17, at 38.
149. Friends of the Earth Canada et al., Coal-fired Power Plants—Submission, SEM-04-005
(Sept. 20, 2004). The submitters asserted that the United States is failing to effectively enforce
the U.S. Clean Water Act against coal-fired power plants for mercury emissions that are allegedly
degrading thousands of rivers, lakes and other waterbodies across the United States. The
Secretariat determined that a factual record was warranted on December 5, 2005. Secretariat,
Article 15(1) Notification to Council that Development of a Factual Record is Warranted, Coalfired Power Plants, A14/SEM/04-005/48/ADV (Dec. 5, 2005). On June 23, the Council finally
recommended the preparation of a factual record. Council Resolution 08-03, C/C.01/08/RES/
03/Final (June 23, 2008). For all the documents relating to this submission, see CEC.org, Coalfired Power Plants, http://www.cec.org/citizen/submissions/details/index.cfm?varlan=english&
ID=103 (last visited Oct. 30, 2008).
150. The Secretariat recommended the preparation of a factual record on May 18, 2005.
Council voted to instruct the Secretariat to develop a factual record on May 30, 2008. For a
timeline for this submission, SEM-03-003, see CEC.org, Lake Chapala II, http://www.cec.org/
citizen/submissions/details/index.cfm?varlan=english&ID=90 (last visited Oct. 30, 2008).
151. Garver, supra note 17, at 38.
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as well as by underscoring the Council’s unwillingness to take the process and
the submitters seriously.
In another case, BC-Mining, Canada initiated administrative actions after
the submission was filed in order to quash it.152 While the initiation of an
administrative action would normally be a positive outcome of the submission
process, it was clear from the beginning that the administrative actions were a
sham; Canada has not taken action to compel compliance with the relevant
fisheries laws.153
Lastly, the factual records culminate in nothing more than the factual
record—the NAAEC does not require governments to address issues raised in
the factual record. Thus, the factual record is a dead end. In the United States,
the Migratory Birds submission has resulted in no changes in the way the Fish
and Wildlife Service implements the Migratory Bird Treaty Act.154 Council

152. Article 14(3)(a) of the NAAEC directs the Secretariat to halt a factual inquiry when the
matter is subject to pending judicial or administrative proceedings NAAEC, supra note 5, art.
14(3)(a).
153. BC Mining was submitted in June 1998. Sierra Club of British Columbia, et al., A
Submission to the Commission on Environmental Cooperation Pursuant to Article 14 of the North
American Agreement on Environmental Cooperation, BC Mining—Submission, SEM/98-004/06,
CEC, (June 1998) (SEM 98-004), available at http://www.cec.org/files/pdf/sem/98-4-SUB-E.pdf.
Canada sent letters to the owners of the Mt. Washington mine, used as an example of Canada’s
widespread failure to enforce the Fisheries Act, on July 30, 1999. See Canada, BC Mining—
Party Response, SEM/98-004/06/RSP, CEC, (Sept. 8, 1999) (SEM 98-004), available at
http://www.cec.org/files/pdf/sem/98-4-RSP-E.pdf. On September 28, 1998, Canada sent a
“warning letter” to the owner of the Tulsequah Chief Mine, also used by submitters to illustrate
Canada’s pattern of non-enforcement. Id. at 5–6, 24. Canada claimed that the warning letter
constituted a “pending judicial or administrative proceeding.” Id. at 25. Because of Canada’s
action, the two mines were removed from consideration in the factual record. Council Res. 01-11,
CEC, C/C.01/01-06/RES/05/Final (Nov. 16, 2001), available at http://www.cec.org/files/
PDF/COUNCIL/res01-11e.pdf. The transparent nature of these sham administrative actions,
however, is manifest; the two-year limitation under Canadian law to bring summary conventions
had already expired and Canada failed to respond to this concern of submitters. Moreover, a
conservation group reports that Canada has made no progress to eliminate acid mine drainage at
the Tulsequah mine, one of the mine sites eliminated from consideration due to Canada’s
administrative action. Environmental Law Institute, Final Report: Issues Related to Articles 14
and 15 of the North American Agreement on Environmental Cooperation 17 (2003) (citing Letter
from Transboundary Watershed Alliance to Joint Public Advisory Committee (Sept. 16, 2003))
[hereinafter ELI Report], available at http://www.cec.org/files/pdf/ABOUTUS/ELI-Art14-15Report-Final-5_en.pdf.
154. The International Environmental Law Project (IELP) submitted requests for information
concerning any actions following up on the Migratory Birds submission. The Forest Service
responded that they had no records responsive to the request. See, e.g., Letter from Corbin L.
Newman, Jr., Director of Forest Management, U.S. Department of Agriculture, to Erica J.
Thorson, IELP (Nov. 8, 2007) (on file with author). The Fish & Wildlife Service provided one
record of enforcement of the MBTA against a person who cut down a tree with one red-tailed
hawk in it but no information relating to changes in policy to enforce the MBTA against loggers.
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has also indicated its unwillingness to evaluate implementation of factual
records. When the JPAC recently indicated that it would undertake a review of
“progress made in addressing the enforcement issues identified in a factual
record,”155 Council admonished the JPAC by “clarify[ing]” that the NAAEC
submissions process “does not contemplate any action by the Secretariat or the
Council after the publication of a factual record.”156 Concerning JPAC’s
desire to undertake a yearly initiative to review published factual records,
Council added that “any such action would be beyond the scope of the
NAAEC.”
In sum, the member governments, individually or through the Council,
have chosen to treat the citizen submission process as an adversarial, rather
than a cooperative, process. The manner in which the Parties and the Council
have eroded the credibility of the process indicates that it may not be the most
appropriate model for future FTAs.
D. The Secretariat’s Independent Reports
Article 13 reports are intended to highlight some aspect of the North
American environment worthy of review. The Secretariat has used this
authority judiciously, preparing only six Article 13 reports. These have
included the investigation of site-specific problems, such as the investigation
into the deaths of 40,000 migratory birds in Guanajuato, Mexico,157 border
issues, such as the report on threats to migratory bird habitat in the San Pedro
River Basin,158 and continent-wide concerns, such as the study to assess longrange transport of atmospheric pollutants159 and environmental challenges
posed by the North American electricity market.160
The authority of the Secretariat to develop these reports has proved to be
very valuable.161 The report on long-range pollutants helped facilitate
negotiations by the NAAEC Parties for the Stockholm Convention on

Letter from Kevin R. Adams, Chief, Office of Law Enforcement, Fish & Wildlife Service, to
Erica J. Thorson, IELP (July 10, 2006) (on file with author).
155. JPAC, Advice to Council No.: 08-01, Re: Submissions on Enforcement Matters: Lessons
Learned to Following up Factual Records (Feb. 27, 2008).
156. Letter from David McGovern, Alternative Representative for Canada (on behalf of
Council), to Ms. Jane Gardner, JPAC Chair (Apr. 16, 2008).
157. CEC Secretariat, Report on the Death of Migratory Birds at the Silva Reservoir (1995).
158. CEC Secretariat, Ribbon of Life: An Agenda for Preserving Transboundary Bird Habitat
on the Upper San Pedro River (1999).
159. CEC Secretariat, Continental Pollutant Pathways: An Agenda for Cooperation to
Address Long-Range Transport of Air Pollution in North America (1997).
160. CEC Secretariat, Environmental Challenges and Opportunities of the Evolving North
American Electricity Market (June 2002).
161. For a report-by-report assessment of the beneficial outcomes of the Article 13 reports,
see David A. Wirth, supra note 99.
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Persistent Organic Pollutants,162 now a major multilateral environmental
agreement that protects human health and the environment from persistent
organic pollutants.163 The San Pedro Report galvanized public support for the
watershed and led the United States and Mexico to develop a Memorandum of
Understanding to work together to protect the Upper San Pedro watershed.164
Nonetheless, Mexico viewed the first Article 13 report, an analysis of why
40,000 birds died at the La Silva Reservoir in Mexico (they died of bacterial
infections resulting from agricultural runoff), as being decided “against” it.165
(In fact, Mexico considered the entire environmental side agreement as
adversarial because no equivalent agreement was negotiated for NAFTA’s
precursor, the U.S.-Canada FTA.166) Similarly, the United States viewed the
Article 13 report on genetically modified maize, which found genetically
modified maize in Mexico despite a Mexican import ban on it, as an
indictment of U.S. policies that promote genetically modified agricultural
crops. The United States called the report “methodologically ‘fundamentally
Mexico disagreed with the report’s
flawed and unscientific.’”167
conclusions.168
While acknowledging the Secretariat’s independence on Article 13
matters, particularly those relating to the annual program and not subject to
Council approval, the Parties have resisted that independence. In a review of
the implementation of Article 13, Professor David Wirth reports that
“[c]onsultations with the Parties have tended over time to become more
extensive and more formal . . . perhaps even inconsistent with the structure and
intent of Article 13.169 Nonetheless, the Parties have come to expect such
consultation. Recognizing the backlash against the Secretariat, Wirth
recommends that to preserve the Secretariat’s independence on Article 13
matters, “the Secretariat should—as it has—conduct consultations with the
Parties on the express understanding that this is a courtesy on the part of the
Secretariat.”170

162. WOLD, GAINES & BLOCK, supra note 27, at 823.
163. Stockholm Convention on Persistent Organic Pollutants, May 22, 2001, 40 I.L.M. 532
(2001), available at http://www.pops.int.
164. WOLD, GAINES & BLOCK, supra note 27, at 824.
165. Independent Review Committee, supra note 57, at 8.
166. Id. at 8–9.
167. United States, U.S. Government Comments to the Secretariat’s Draft Article 13 Report
Maize and Biodiversity: The Effects of Transgenic Maize in Mexico (July 23, 2004), in CEC
Secretariat, Maize & Biodiversity: The Effects of Transgenic Maize in Mexico, Key Findings and
Recommendations, Attachment (2004) [hereinafter Maize & Biodiversity].
168. David A. Wirth, supra note 99, at 18–19.
169. Id. at 29.
170. Id.
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IV. AFTER THE NAAEC: DR-CAFTA AND BEYOND
The development of an international institution, complete with processes
for citizen participation in enforcement matters, provides a tantalizing model
for replication in other trade regimes. While some elements of the NAAEC
regime could provide “inspiration to integrate nontrade issues”171 in trade
regimes, it is not clear that the NAAEC model can or should be replicated. As
noted above, the NAAEC focuses on competitiveness and enforcement
concerns even though the empirical evidence does not suggest these are major
worries. Where the NAAEC has proved to be most innovative and where it
could produce significant and positive environmental outcomes, the NAAEC
Parties have used flawed institutional structures to mitigate those benefits. For
example, the Parties have taken a dim view to citizens shining a light on their
failures to enforce environmental law and reduced the importance of the citizen
submission process. They have also tired of the Secretariat’s independence
and have formalized structures to limit that independence.
Nonetheless, with few models to choose from, the United States has
latched unto the basic NAAEC model without evaluating its strengths and
weaknesses172 for post-NAAEC FTAs. Not only is the competitiveness/
enforcement focus less relevant than a focus on scale, but the environmental,
political, institutional and social circumstances of many of the countries with
which the United States has negotiated FTAs do not lend themselves to some
aspects of the NAAEC model.
To the extent that the United States has negotiated changes to NAAECinspired provisions, it has done so largely to retain greater political control
rather than improve trade-environment linkages. For example, many FTAs
have eliminated the Secretariat, thereby eliminating any possibility for
independent reports to be produced on environmental issues within the scope
of the FTA. Not all changes have weakened trade-environment linkages,
however. As described more fully in Section V, the U.S.-Peru FTA
acknowledges the specific environmental and social contexts of Peru—
particularly in the forest sector—and attempts to address the problems through
detailed forest-specific provisions. While that FTA does not require any

171. Pierre Marc Johnson, From Trade Liberlisation to Sustainable Development: The
Challenges of Integrated Global Governance, in LINKING TRADE, ENVIRONMENT, AND SOCIAL
COHESION: NAFTA EXPERIENCES, GLOBAL CHALLENGES supra note 127, at 34.
172. See Block, supra note 46, at 514 (noting that in the context of a Free Trade Area of the
Americas (FTAA), policy makers must “attempt to evaluate the strengths and weaknesses of the
NAAEC as one of the few models potentially applicable to the greater hemisphere in the
FTAA”). Negotiations over the hemisphere-wide FTAA have since floundered for reasons largely
relating to agricultural subsidies. See Garver, supra note 17, at 39 (concluding that “[i]t is clear
that environmental mechanisms in the NAFTA package have not met their promise or potential,
and yet they are being duplicated with little analysis or meaningful modification”).
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changes before the FTA comes into force, it is at least a step towards
rethinking the environment in the context of trade.
A.

Embracing the NAAEC’s Enforcement Model
1. Enforcement of Environmental Laws

All of the FTAs negotiated subsequent to NAFTA and the NAAEC start,
like the NAAEC, by committing the Parties to ensure that their domestic
environmental laws provide for high levels of environmental protection and to
strive to continue to improve such laws.173 In these FTAs, the Parties also
recognize that it is “inappropriate to encourage trade and investment by
weakening or reducing the protections afforded in domestic environmental
laws.”174 Most of these FTAs make these obligations enforceable through
dispute settlement procedures175 or through consultations, as under DRCAFTA.176 The FTAs also provide that a Party “shall not fail to effectively
enforce its environmental laws, through a sustained or recurring course of
action or inaction, in a manner affecting trade between the Parties.”177 These
obligations are also subject to dispute settlement.178

173. See, e.g., U.S.-Peru FTA, supra note 22, art. 18.1:
Recognizing the sovereign right of each Party to establish its own levels of domestic
environmental protection and environmental development priorities, and to adopt or
modify accordingly its environmental laws and policies, each Party shall strive to ensure
that those laws and policies provide for and encourage high levels of environmental
protection and shall strive to continue to improve its respective levels of environmental
protection.
Almost identical language is found in other FTAs. See, e.g., United States-Australia Free Trade
Agreement, U.S.-Austl., art. 19.1, May 19, 2004, 43 I.L.M. 1248 [hereinafter U.S.-Australia
FTA], available at http://www.ustr.gov/assets/Trade_Agreements/Bilateral/Australia_FTA/Final_
Text/asset_upload_file148_5168.pdf; United States-Chile Free Trade Agreement, U.S.-Chile, art.
19.1, June 6, 2003, 42 I.L.M. 1026 [hereinafter U.S.-Chile FTA], available at
http://www.ustr.gov/assets/Trade_Agreements/Bilateral/Chile_FTA/Final_Texts/asset_upload_fil
e535_3989.pdf; Agreement between the Government of the United States and the Government of
the Kingdom of Bahrain on the Establishment of a Free Trade Agreement, U.S.-Bahr., art. 16.1,
Sept. 14, 2004, 44 I.L.M. 544 (2005) [hereinafter U.S.-Bahrain FTA], available at
http://www.ustr.gov/Trade_Agreements/Bilateral/Bahrain_FTA/final_texts/Section_Index.html;
DR-CAFTA, supra note 20, art. 17.1.
174. U.S.-Chile FTA, supra note 173, art. 19.2(2). See also U.S.-Peru FTA, supra note 22,
art. 18.3(2); DR-CAFTA, supra note 20, art. 17.2(2); U.S.-Australia FTA, supra note 173 art.
19.2; U.S.-Bahrain FTA, supra note 173, art. 16.2(2).
175. U.S.-Chile FTA, supra note 173, art. 19.6. See also U.S.-Australia FTA, supra note 173,
art. 19.7.
176. DR-CAFTA, supra note 20, art. 17.10. See also U.S.-Bahrain FTA, supra note 173, art.
16.8.
177. U.S.-Chile FTA, supra note 173, art. 19.2(1)(a). See also DR-CAFTA, supra note 20,
art. 18.2(1)(a); U.S.-Peru FTA, supra note 22, art. 18.3(1)(a). In the case of Australia, where
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Because these provisions are included in the FTA itself, rather than a “side
agreement,” the United States has championed such provisions as further
integration of trade and the environment.179 Because there is no legal
difference between placing the environmental provisions in a side agreement
or in the FTA itself, this benefit is more imagined than real. More
fundamentally, there is, of course, nothing inherently wrong with guarding
against efforts to weaken environmental law to attract investment and
encourage trade. However, these provisions are unlikely to yield benefits. As
noted above, little, if any, evidence suggests that companies move to countries
with weak environmental laws or that countries weaken their environmental
laws to increase trade or attract investment.180
In addition, because these provisions have never been invoked in the
NAAEC or in an FTA, it is questionable whether a government sanctions
process to address environmental matters would encourage cooperation on
environmental matters. Indeed, fearing that a sanctions process would be
counterproductive, a high-level expert group formally recommended in 2004
that “the [NAAEC] Parties publicly commit to refrain from invoking [the
dispute settlement provisions] for a period of 10 years.”181 Nevertheless, the
United States claims that the “mere existence of this enforcement tool helps to
ensure full implementation of FTA environmental obligations even if no
disputes have been brought to date.”182
If the government sanctions processes in the NAAEC and subsequent
FTAs are any indication, the dispute settlement provisions to address
environmental matters will remain dormant. Unless real and measurable
competitiveness issues arise from a failure to enforce environmental law, a
Party to an FTA is unlikely to view that failure as raising vital interests worth
litigating.183 The potential harm to relations with trading partners and fears of
retaliation make litigation over the “amorphous benefits of enforcement”
unattractive.184

many environmental matters are the responsibility of the States, these obligations extend to
relevant federal and state laws. U.S.-Australia FTA, supra note 173, art. 19.2(1)(a).
178. U.S.-Chile FTA, supra note 173, art. 19.6. See U.S.-Australia FTA, supra note 173, art.
19.7; U.S.-Peru FTA, supra note 22, art. 18.12; DR-CAFTA, supra note 20, art. 17.10(7).
179. Mark Linscott, Demonstrable Benefits, 25 ENVIRONMENTAL F. 39, 39 (2008). The
author is the Assistant United States Trade Representative for Environment and Natural
Resources and has responsibility for all U.S. trade and environment matters.
180. See supra Section II.A.
181. TRAC, supra note 102, at 55.
182. Linscott, supra note 179, at 39.
183. See Yang, supra note 18, at 482 (noting that the failure to use the NAAEC’s sanctions
process is consistent with the public choice of enforcement).
184. Id.
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2. Citizen Submissions on Failures to Enforce Environmental Laws
Although the United States has negotiated general enforcement provisions
similar to the NAAEC’s, it has altered course with respect to the citizen
submission process. The citizen submission process has been characterized as
“the unprecedented commitment by the three [NAAEC] governments to
account internationally for the enforcement of their environmental laws,”185
and it thus could be considered the centerpiece of any effort to prevent
competitiveness effects. Nonetheless, FTAs with Australia, Chile, Jordan and
Morocco, among others, do not include a citizen submission process. Only the
DR-CAFTA,186 Colombia,187 Panama188 and Peru189 FTAs include a citizen
submission process.
Even where these FTAs have included a submissions process, they have
largely incorporated all the institutional flaws of the NAAEC model. As a
consequence, as in the NAAEC, there are no checks on the Council’s powers
to overrule the decisions of the Secretariat. Similarly, the FTAs do not impose
deadlines for Council to act on recommendations of the Secretariat. They do,
however, require preparation of a factual record with the assent of a single
Party, unlike the supermajority the NAAEC requires.190
Perhaps most important, the citizen submission processes of FTAs are
likely to be adversarial rather than cooperative, just as in the NAAEC. In the
context of DR-CAFTA, with its history of violence and repressive regimes,
this characteristic is likely to stifle use of the citizen submission process.191 To
date, only one submission has been brought, and that was by the Humane
Society of the United States,192 a U.S.-based nongovernmental organization
with a U.S. government contract to perform DR-CAFTA-related activities.
185. TRAC, supra note 102, at 4.
186. DR-CAFTA, supra note 20, arts. 17.7–17.8.
187. U.S.-Colombia FTA, supra note 21, arts. 18.8–18.9.
188. United States-Panama Trade Promotion Agreement, U.S.-Pan., arts. 17.8–17.9, Jun. 28,
2007 [hereinafter U.S.-Panama FTA], available at http://ustr.gov/Trade_Agreements/Bilateral/
Panama_FTA/Final_Text/Section_Index.html.
189. U.S.-Peru FTA, supra note 22, arts. 18.8–18.9.
190. See, e.g., DR-CAFTA, supra note 20, art. 17.8.2; U.S.-Peru FTA, supra note 22, art.
18.9.2
191. In September 2008, for example, Yuri Melini, the Director General of the Center for
Environmental, Social and Environmental Action (CALAS) in Guatemala, was shot outside the
home of a relative as he was getting out of his car. The attack was not random. Prior to opening
fire, the gunman called out Mr. Melini’s name. Mr. Melini is a well-known environmental
advocate in Guatemala who, in the week before the attack, published a column calling attention to
threats against human rights and environmental advocates. See Jim Loughran, Guatemala:
Assassination Attempt Against Human Rights Defender Yuri Melini, Sept. 11, 2008,
http://www.frontlinedefenders.org/node/1565.
192. Secretaria de Integración Económica Centroamericana, DR-CAFTA, available at
http://www.sieca.org.gt/site/Enlaces.aspx?ID=003008 (last visited Oct. 30, 2008).
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The U.S. State Department is currently seeking organizations to work with
Central American organizations to prepare enforcement submissions.
The more recent FTAs also eliminate some of the NAAEC’s more
important elements. For example, none of the FTAs establish a JPAC or
similar independent voice authorized by the FTA itself to provide advice to the
Council and the Secretariat. That independent voice has been essential for
highlighting Council proposals to limit the independence of the CEC
Secretariat. In a formal review of the NAAEC, the review committee noted:
More so than any NGO could, JPAC can observe and remain up-to-date on
CEC issues. Its direct access to the Council and the Secretariat helps keep the
Parties and executive director responsive to their constituencies in a way that a
193
broader, more generalized public discourse could not.

The failure of FTAs to include an independent body like the JPAC acting as
the “intermediary between the Council and the concerned public”194 and the
“public conscience”195 of the CEC is a real loss for subsequent FTAs. The
absence of anything similar to the JPAC in subsequent FTAs suggests that the
United States and its trading partners want as little public oversight as possible.
B.

New Institutional Arrangements

Although the substantive provisions of post-NAAEC FTAs mirror those of
the NAAEC, the institutional structures have changed. The independence of a
Secretariat has been eliminated or sharply limited, and much more
government-centered commissions have emerged.
1. The Elimination of a Quasi-Independent Secretariat
Despite the widespread view that the NAAEC was innovative and
revolutionary (in large part due to the quasi-independent role of the
Secretariat), none of the post-NAAEC FTAs creates a quasi-independent
Secretariat to address or coordinate environmental issues among the Parties.
DR-CAFTA196 and the other Latin American FTAs197 that include a citizen
submission process establish Secretariats, but their mandates are limited solely
to reviewing citizen submissions alleging failures to enforce environmental law

193. TRAC, supra note 102, at 34.
194. Id.
195. Id.
196. See Agreement Establishing a Secretariat for Environmental Matters under the
Dominican Republic-Central America-United States Free Trade Agreement (2006), available at
http://www.ustr.gov/Trade_Agreements/Regional/CAFTA/Section_Index.html.
197. U.S.-Colombia FTA, supra note 21, art. 18.8; U.S.-Panama FTA, supra note 188, art.
17.8; U.S.-Peru FTA, supra note 22, art. 18.8. In each case, the Parties will designate the
Secretariat through a exchange of letters or other agreement.
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effectively.198 As under DR-CAFTA, where the Parties requested that the
Secretariat de Integracióon Económica Centroamericana (SIECA)199 establish
the Secretariat, the other FTAs will likely establish a Secretariat within an
existing organization.
The failure to include a quasi-independent Secretariat rests in large part
with the lack of trust that the United States has in the CEC’s Secretariat.
Ironically, that mistrust developed as the Secretariat assumed greater
responsibility and independence due to a vacuum created by the Council and
the NAAEC Parties. Initially, the NAAEC’s Council was not organized.
Indeed, because of low interest or other events that required greater attention,
the Secretariat prepared the initial work program with almost no input from the
governments.200 With little guidance from the Council, the Secretariat “spent
the first several years deliberately testing various areas of activity listed in the
NAAEC,” eventually choosing the work program and its main themes.201 As a
consequence of this inattention, the Council encouraged a very independent
Secretariat.
In addition to this lack of attention within the CEC, the NAAEC Parties
were not organized internally. This came to a head when the Secretariat
released the “Maize Report,” which looked into the impacts of genetically
modified corn on native varieties of maize in Mexico.202 In criticizing the
Secretariat, the United States claimed that “[t]he process used to prepare this
draft report would have benefited from greater transparency and
communication to the Parties as to the intended scope, timeline and peer
review procedures of the draft report.”203 In truth, the Secretariat had been
consulting with many members of the U.S. government—those with relevant
expertise—but those communications were apparently not known to EPA
decisionmakers. A report of the implementation of Article 13 details the many
communications between the Secretariat and the Parties, including the refusal
by the United States to have the Secretariat brief it on the process, draft report,
and the report’s recommendations.204

198. Agreement Establishing a Secretariat for Environmental Matters, supra note 196, art. 5.
199. SIECA is a regional institution based in Guatemala that provides advice on technical and
administrative aspects of economic integration within Central America. SIECA, “Que es
SIECA?”, http://www.sieca.org.gt/site/VisorDocs.aspx?IDDOC=Cache/17990000000002/179900
00000002.swf (last visited Oct. 30, 2008).
200. TRAC, supra note 102, at 10.
201. Id.
202. Maize & Biodiversity, supra note 167.
203. United States, U.S. Government Comments to the Secretariat’s Draft Article 13 Report
Maize and Biodiversity: The Effects of Transgenic Maize in Mexico (July 23, 2004), in Maize &
Biodiversity, supra note 167, at Attachment.
204. David A. Wirth, supra note 99, at 16.
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In the ensuing backlash, a great mistrust has developed between the Parties
and the Secretariat. The United States has responded by seeking to micromanage the CEC Secretariat. It has also reacted by omitting any Secretariat in
many subsequent FTAs and, where a Secretariat is contemplated, eliminating
much of the independence that the CEC Secretariat has. As a consequence, the
great strength of the Secretariat to act as a neutral forum for the discussion of
issues has been lost.205
2. Two New Institutional Approaches
In the absence of a Secretariat to propose a work program and undertake
other substantive and administrative tasks, as under the NAAEC, the United
States has adopted two different institutional models. With distant trading
partners, such as Australia and Bahrain, the FTAs do not include any
commission at all to coordinate environmental activities. Instead, these FTAs
create a “joint committee” composed of governmental trade officials to oversee
implementation of the FTA.206 The joint committee may, if it so chooses,
create a subcommittee on environmental matters.207 They also call for separate
agreements or joint statements on environmental cooperation through which
the Parties will explore ways to cooperate on environmental matters and
strengthen their capacity to protect the environment.208
While the distance between two trading partners may eliminate
transboundary effects from trade, such as increased pollution along the U.SMexico border from additional cross-border trucking,209 distance itself does
not insulate a country from the environmental effects of trade. Even at

205. Janine Ferretti, Innovations in Managing Globalization: Lessons from the North
American Experience, 15 GEO. INT’L ENVTL. L. REV. 367 (2003) (describing the value of the
CEC Secretariat as a neutral forum for discussing trade-environment issues).
206. See, e.g., U.S.-Australia FTA, supra note 173, art. 19.5; U.S.-Bahrain FTA, supra note
173, art. 16.5. Some FTAs, such as the U.S.-Jordan FTA, do not expressly state that the Joint
Committee may wish to establish a subcommittee on environmental matters, but such authority is
inherent in the Joint Committee’s authority to “establish and delegate responsibilities to ad hoc
and standing committees or working groups.” United States-Jordan Free Trade Agreement, U.S.Jordan FTA, art. 15.3.b, Oct. 24, 2000, available at http://www.ustr.gov/Trade_Agreements/
Bilateral/Jordan/Section_Index.html.
207. U.S.-Australia FTA, supra note 173, art. 19.5.1; U.S.-Bahrain FTA, supra note 173, art.
16.5.1.
208. See, e.g., U.S.-Australia FTA, art. 19.5.1; United States-Morocco Free Trade Agreement,
U.S.-Morocco, art. 17.3.3, June 15, 2004, 44 I.L.M. 544 [hereinafter U.S.-Morocco FTA],
available at http://www.ustr.gov/Trade_Agreements/Bilateral/Morocco_FTA/Final_Text-Section
_Index.html.
209. INDUSTRIAL ECONOMICS, INCORPORATED, ANALYSIS OF DIESEL EMISSIONS IN THE
U.S.-MEXICO BORDER REGION (Mar. 9, 2007). This report, prepared for the U.S. Environmental
Protection Agency, documents the rise in truck emissions along the border resulting from
NAFTA and other factors.
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relatively low volumes of trade, trade in certain products may have a
disproportionate environmental impact. For example, increased trade in timber
products from a country with few or small forests could generate
environmental impacts greater than the volume of trade would suggest. As
such, these FTAs would benefit from a standing commission that identifies and
evaluates environmental impacts resulting from the trade agreement.
The second approach, used exclusively with the U.S.’s Latin American
trading partners,210 establishes an Environment Affairs Council. These
Councils are composed of cabinet level officials, although they do not need to
be environment ministers. In addition to providing opportunities for public
participation, each Council is charged with overseeing implementation of the
environmental provisions of the FTA, such as those on enforcement.211 In
addition, they are responsible for developing an Environmental Cooperation
Agreement (ECA), to elaborate on the role of environmental matters in the
FTAs and create processes for the Parties to establish joint work programs to
address conservation and other matters.
The ECAs remain quite general and extremely similar concerning the types
of projects to be undertaken, suggesting that little thought went into tailoring
the ECAs to the specific environmental and institutional needs of the Parties.
The ECA for DR-CAFTA, for example, calls for exchanges of delegations,
professionals and others to strengthen environmental policies, as well as
conferences and joint programs, the exchange of information, and the
development and transfer of knowledge and technologies, among other
things.212
Each ECA also establishes an Environmental Cooperation Commission,
composed of government representatives,213 responsible for developing
cooperative environmental work programs.214 The provisions of the ECA get
210. DR-CAFTA, supra note 20, art. 17.5; U.S.-Chile FTA, art. 19.3; U.S.-Colombia FTA,
supra note 21, art. 18.6; U.S.-Panama FTA, supra note 188, art. 17.6; U.S.-Peru FTA, supra note
22, art. 18.6.
211. DR-CAFTA, supra note 20, art. 17.5.2; U.S.-Chile FTA, supra note 173, art. 19.3.1;
U.S.-Colombia FTA, supra note 21, art. 18.6.2; U.S.-Panama FTA, supra note 188, art. 17.6.2;
U.S.-Peru FTA, supra note 22, art. 18.6.2.
212. Agreement among the Governments of Costa Rica, the Dominican Republic, El
Salvador, Guatemala, Honduras, and the United States of America on Environmental
Cooperation, art. III, Feb. 18, 2005, available at http://www.state.gov/g/oes/rls/or/42423.htm
[hereinafter DR-CAFTA ECA]. See U.S.-Chile Environmental Cooperation Agreement, June 17,
2003, available at http://www.state.gov/g/oes/rls/or/43756.htm [hereinafter U.S.-Chile ECA].
213. The DR-CAFTA and U.S.-Chile ECAs designate “high-level officials” from the
Department of State as the U.S. representative. The DR-CAFTA ECA designates officials from
the party’s environmental ministry, whereas the U.S.-Chile ECA designates Chile’s Ministry of
Foreign Affairs as the commission representatives. DR-CAFTA ECA, supra note 212, arts. IV.2,
IV.3.a; U.S.-Chile ECA, supra note 212, art. II.1.
214. DR-CAFTA ECA, supra note 212, art. V; U.S.-Chile ECA, supra note 212, art. II.2.
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slightly more specific concerning the goals of the work programs. The DRCAFTA ECA directs its Commission to create a work program designed to,
among other things: (1) strengthen each Party’s environmental management
systems, (2) develop and promote incentives for environmental protection, (3)
conserve and manage shared, migratory and endangered species, and (4) build
capacity to promote public participation.215 The U.S.-Chile ECA is even more
general, providing that a subsequent work program must include activities to
(1) collect and publish comparable information on each Party’s environmental
legislation, indicators and enforcement activities, (2) exchange information on
environmental laws and policies and implementation of multilateral
environmental agreements, and (3) promote sustainable management
practices.216
At last, the work plans to implement the ECAs get specific. For example,
the 2006 DR-CAFTA work plan217 provided $250,000 for technical assistance
to harmonize environmental regulations, implementing procedures and
enforcement policies. The Parties allocated another $275,000 to improve
implementation and enforcement of environmental law and $200,000 to
strengthen environmental impact assessment of projects.218 Other projects are
designed to improve natural resources management through ecotourism by
eliminating barriers that prevent funds from reaching protected areas and
promoting water conservation within the tourism industry, among other
things.219 A project to encourage market and income incentives to promote
sustainable development investigates the adoption of sustainable coffee and
agricultural production practices.220 The 2005–2006 U.S.-Chile work program
also provided for sharing best practices to promote and ensure compliance with
environmental laws and regulations and capacity building for ecotourism, as
well as consultations and exchanges concerning a range of topics within the
scope of the ECA.221
The DR-CAFTA ECA and work program bear one substantial
improvement over the NAAEC. Whereas the CEC’s budget has been forever

215. DR-CAFTA ECA, supra note 212, art. V.1.
216. U.S.-Chile ECA, supra note 212, art. III.2.
217. 2006 DR-CAFTA Environmental Cooperation Agreement Work Plan, available at
http://www.marn.gob.gt/documentos/ccad/environmental.pdf. See U.S. Department of State, DRCAFTA Labor and Environment Projects, (Sept. 28, 2006), available at http://www.state.gov/r/
pa/prs/ps/2006/73328.htm (describing 2006 projects); U.S. Department of State, DR-CAFTA
Environmental Projects (Jan. 30, 2008), available at http://www.state.gov/r/pa/prs/ps/2008/jan/99
875.htm (describing 2007 projects).
218. Id. at 2–5.
219. Id. at 7.
220. Id. at 9–10.
221. U.S.-Chile Work Program 2005–2006, available at http://www.state.gov/g/oes/rls/or/
43756.htm.
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locked at $9 million,222 the DR-CAFTA budget for environmental projects was
$18.5 million for 2006 and $19.3 million for 2007.223 However, the ECAs do
not commit Parties to provide funding for the cooperative work program and
instead make the work programs subject to availability of resources.224 To
date, the United States has paid for activities under the cooperative work
programs.225
3. The Environmental Cooperation Agreements are Inadequate
Despite increases in funding for environmental activities relative to the
NAAEC’s budget, at least under DR-CAFTA, and projects designed to
improve implementation and enforcement of environmental law, the ECAs are
inadequate to address scale issues and the institutional needs of trading
partners to cope with the environmental effects of trade-led growth. As
described above in Section III.A.2, perhaps the most important lesson from the
NAFTA and NAAEC experience is that comprehensive and far-reaching
environmental and development objectives must be established
and
implemented before liberalizing trade. As explained, while NAFTA has
increased trade among the Parties, increased growth—particularly in Mexico—
and promoted efficiencies in many natural resource-based economic sectors,
those efficiency gains have not prevented pollution and resource use from
increasing quite dramatically. Had institutions been prepared before
liberalization, some of these problems could have been prevented. By waiting
until after the effects have occurred, the damage can only be controlled, not
prevented. The work plans of the ECAs are not being adopted, much less
implemented, until well after the FTA requires trade barriers to be lowered or
removed. The DR-CAFTA Parties, for example, did not agree on a work plan
until July 19, 2006, more than one year after DR-CAFTA entered into force for
most Parties.226
Moreover, without an independent Secretariat, no institution is charged
with developing information about the environmental effects of trade. As the

222. The NAAEC does not set the budget at $9 million. Despite inflation and currency
fluctuations, the CEC’s budget has remained at $9 million since the NAAEC’s entry into force.
223. See Press Release U.S. Department of State, U.S. Commits Funding For Labor and
Environmental Protection for Central America-Dominican Republic Free Trade Agreement
Countries (Jan. 30, 2008), available at usembassy.or.cr/CAFTADR%20labor%20fact%20sheet%
20CLEAN.pdf.
224. DR-CAFTA ECA, supra note 212, art. VIII.1 (providing that “All cooperative activities
under the Agreement shall be subject to the availability of funds and of human and other
resources, and to the applicable laws and regulations of the appropriate Parties.). See U.S.-Chile
ECA, supra note 212, art. VII.1.
225. See U.S. Commits Funding for Labor and Environmental Protection, supra note 223.
226. U.S. Department of State, Supporting Free Trade and Environmental Protection,
http://www.state.gov/g/oes/env/trade/index.htm (last visited Oct. 30, 2008).
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history of the CEC shows, governments are all too willing to control
information. With an independent Secretariat, not only could such information
be developed and published, but the independence of the Secretariat can shield
controversial results from hostile governments. This situation occurred when
the CEC’s Secretariat initiated its study of the environmental effects of
NAFTA227 and when it assessed the possible impacts of genetically modified
corn on maize in Mexico.228
V. NEW DIRECTIONS FOR TRADE-ENVIRONMENT LINKAGES
Before the United States and other countries negotiate new FTAs, they
need to step back and learn the lessons of NAFTA and NAAEC for the design
of environmental linkages in FTAs. Because they are not doing that, they are
failing to develop more effective ideas and institutions for improving tradeenvironment linkages. Building on the lessons of NAFTA and NAAEC, FTAs
should concentrate on scale effects from trade-based growth, identify the
institutional needs of trading partners both for addressing scale effects and in
the larger environmental context, and commit to effective public participation
and public oversight of trade-environment linkages.
A.

Focus on Scale Effects

While future FTAs should continue to include provisions that prevent
competitiveness effects, such as requirements to enforce environmental law
effectively, they should make efforts to identify, prevent and mitigate scale
effects. As discussed in Section III.A, the work of the CEC and others has
shown that scale effects are far more serious than competitiveness effects. In
particular, much more work is needed before an FTA enters into force to assess
the impact of trade liberalization caused by specific economic sectors and, to
the extent possible, in particular regions. Moreover, once the FTA enters into

227. Block, supra note 46, at 522. The CEC’s study of the environmental effects of trade
provides one cogent example. Although Article 10(6) of the NAAEC requires the Parties to
consider the environmental effects of NAFTA “on an ongoing basis,” the Secretariat has
undertaken this work without the full support of the Parties. As Greg Block writes:
In furtherance of [Article 10(6)], the CEC Secretariat developed a framework for
assessing the environmental impacts of free trade in the NAFTA region, held two public
symposia to apply and refine the approach, and published numerous working papers and
monographs on the subject. The project, initially clothed as an academic exercise focused
on methodological issues, quietly evolved into a potent source of information on a diverse
range of important issues. To date, the Secretariat has been able to pursue its publiclydriven research agenda despite the reluctance and, earlier, outright hostility of some
officials from trade and other departments.
Id. at 521–522.
228. See Maize & Biodiversity, supra note 167, and accompanying text.
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force, processes must be in place to monitor impacts and strategies (or
obligations) agreed upon to mitigate them.
A focus on scale will require a corresponding commitment to capacity
building and obtaining relevant environmental data prior to entry into force of
the FTA.229 Depending on the circumstances, capacity building may include
information, technical training, technology or substitute products.230 Again,
the CEC’s work shows that FTAs must invest far more in capacity building
within regulatory agencies likely to be impacted by trade agreements to ensure
that those agencies are able to monitor, assess, inspect, enforce and remediate
environmental problems from increased trade.231
This focus seems particularly relevant as FTAs reach areas of greater
economic and other development needs.232 In fact, as the USTR said regarding
DR-CAFTA, the Central American governments’ ability “to effectively
implement and enforce environmental laws has been limited by the lack of
fiscal and human resources.”233 We also know that the economies of

229. Capacity building “respond[s] to the specific lack of capacity to address a problem in a
given circumstance with the necessary support.” INDEPENDENT REVIEW COMMITTEE, supra note
57, at 39.
230. Id.
231. A number of commentators have observed that the NAAEC should focus on capacity
building. See, e.g., id. at 38–40; Block, supra note 46, at 535. It has begun to do so. In the
Puebla Declaration, which established the CEC Council’s vision for the CEC after the first
decade of operations, the Council committed to capacity building, particularly in Mexico:
We recognize the different capacities of the Parties and the continuing, urgent need to
focus on institutional capacity building in order to sustain targeted results. We
acknowledge that this is especially important for Mexico, and want the CEC to assist
those concerned in the three countries—governments, the private sector, environmental
organizations, academia, indigenous and local communities, and others—in gradually
strengthening the capacity for sound environmental management across North America.
CEC Council, Puebla Declaration (June 23, 2004), available at www.cec.org/files/PDF/
COUNCIL/Puebla-Declaration-2004_en.pdf.
232. Mexico, for example, is relatively wealthy compared with the countries in Central
America. In 2005, Mexico’s Gross Domestic Product (GDP) (based on purchasing power parity
(PPP)) of $1,094.3 billion, ranked twelfth among 180 countries. Among DR-CAFTA countries,
Guatemala, whose GDP (PPP) was $56.7 billion, is the wealthiest, ranked 72nd. Costa Rica
ranked 78th at $46.6 billion. On a per capita basis, only Costa Rica compares favorably with
Mexico. Among 180 countries, the United States ranked fourth with a per capita income (PPP) in
2005 of $41,197. Mexico and the DR-CAFTA countries had per capita incomes as follows:
Mexico $10,615 (64), Costa Rica $10,773 (63), El Salvador $ 5,270 (101), Guatemala 4,133
(114). Nicaragua $3,685 (118), Honduras $2,983 (123). International Monetary Fund, World
Economic Outlook (2007), http://www.imf.org/external/pubs/ft/weo/2007/01/data/index.aspx
(last visited Oct. 30, 2008). See also Economic & Social Data Rankings, http://www.data
ranking.com/table.cgi?LG=e&TP=ne03-2&RG=&FL= (last visited Oct. 30, 2008) (compiling the
IMF’s data in an easy-to-use format).
233. OFFICE OF THE U.S. TRADE REPRESENTATIVE, FINAL REVIEW OF THE DOMINICAN
REPUBLIC-CENTRAL AMERICA-UNITED STATES FREE TRADE AGREEMENT 10 (Feb. 22, 2005),
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developing countries generally, and Latin American countries specifically, are
resource based.234 Thus, we should expect effects in these countries similar to
those in Mexico. Much greater funding and energy must be accorded to
improving environmental infrastructure, including technical and legal
capacities.235
In addition, a greater emphasis must be placed on obtaining relevant
environmental data before the FTA comes into force. This is one area where
the United States has clearly learned from the CEC, which has concluded that
the “lack of high-quality environmental data hampers analysis of tradeenvironment linkages.” While some FTAs, including those in Latin America,
are addressing the need for comparative environmental data in their ECAs or
cooperative work programs, that information is coming after the impacts of
FTAs come into force, thus eliminating the ability to gather baseline data for
identifying the effects of trade. Without the relevant information prior to
adoption of an FTA, it will be impossible to accurately assess the impacts of
trade on the environment. Future FTAs should ascertain the need for common
units of measurement for environmental factors, such as reporting on releases
of toxic chemicals.
B.

Identify Institutional and Other Needs

If FTAs focus on anticipating scale effects prior to liberalizing trade, then
they will be better able to anticipate and “either improve environmental laws,
policies, infrastructure, and capacities, as a bulwark against unsustainable trade
patterns, or intervene directly by promoting environmental measures that may
affect trade.”236 While not necessarily adopting a focus on scale effects, the
U.S.-Peru FTA does attempt to identify some of the legal, institutional and
capacity building needs of Peru. As such, it represents what is hopefully a new
approach to trade and environment.
The U.S.-Peru FTA is in many respects very similar to other FTAs. It
adopts the basic NAAEC approach, which focuses on competitiveness effects
and potential enforcement problems.237 However, it diverges significantly
from the NAAEC approach by requiring substantial changes in Peru’s forestry

available at www.ustr.gov/assets/Trade_Agreements/Regional/CAFTA/asset_upload_file953_
7901.pdf. See also, Block, supra note 46, at 534.
234. See Block, supra note 46, at 532–535.
235. Id. at 535.
236. Id. at 520.
237. For example, it commits the Parties to “strive to ensure” that its environmental laws
encourage high levels of environmental protection, to not fail to enforce its environmental laws,
and to avoid weakening or reducing environmental protections to increase trade or attract
investment. U.S.-Peru FTA, supra note 22, art. 18.1–18.3.
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sector. It does so principally because of the high levels of illegal logging and
trade, particularly in mahogany, in Peru.238
As a result, environmental organizations successfully urged U.S.
negotiators to include provisions in the U.S.-Peru FTA concerning forest
management and trade in timber species. In an “Annex on Forest Sector
Governance,” Peru is required to “increase the number and effectiveness of
personnel” devoted to enforcing laws relating to timber harvesting and timber
trade, including within national parks legislation and indigenous lands.239 Peru
must also develop and implement an anti-corruption plan for officials charged
with the administration of forest resources240 and increase criminal and civil
penalties to levels that deter illegal activity.241 Moreover, Peru must improve
implementation of the Convention on International Trade in Endangered
Species of Wild Fauna and Flora (CITES) by conducting comprehensive
surveys of species protected by CITES, such as mahogany;242 establish export
quotas for mahogany243 and improve the administration and management of
forest concessions by, among other things, physically inspecting areas
designated for harvest of any CITES-listed tree species (i.e., mahogany);244 and
develop systems to verify the legal chain of origin of CITES-listed tree
species.245
The demands on Peru do not stop here. For shipments of mahogany
destined for the United States, the United States may ask Peru to investigate
whether a particular Peruvian producer or exporter is in compliance with
applicable laws; Peru is required to provide a written summary of its findings
to the United States.246 With the consent of Peru, U.S. officials may participate
in a site visit to determine a particular producer’s or exporter’s compliance
with applicable law.247
Beyond the provisions specific to the forestry sector, the U.S.-Peru FTA
also establishes a Trade Capacity Building Committee to help the Parties,
particularly Peru, make appropriate reforms to “foster trade-driven economic
238. Several organizations have documented illegal logging, inside national parks and
indigenous reserves within Peru, logging in excess of harvest quotas, and trade in violation of
Peru’s obligations under the Convention on International Trade in Endangered Species of Wild
Fauna and Flora (CITES). See, e.g., Asociación Interétnica de Desarrollo de la Selva Peruana
(The National Association of Amazon Indians in Peru), Illegal Logging and International Trade
in Mahogany (Swietenia macrophylla) from the Peruvian Amazon (May 2007).
239. U.S.-Peru FTA, supra note 22, Annex 18.3.4, ¶ 3(a).
240. Id. Annex 18.3.4, ¶ 3(a)(ii).
241. Id. Annex 18.3.4, ¶¶ (3)(b)–(c).
242. Id. Annex 18.3.4, ¶ 3(d).
243. Id. Annex 18.3.4, ¶ 3(f).
244. U.S.-Peru FTA, supra note 22, Annex 18.3.4, ¶ 3(g).
245. Id. Annex 18.3.4, ¶ 3(h).
246. Id. Annex 18.3.4, ¶¶ 6, 7.
247. Id. Annex 18.3.4, ¶ 10.
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growth, poverty reduction, and adjustment to liberalized trade.”248 This
committee will, among other things, prioritize trade capacity building projects
and monitor and assess progress in implementing trade capacity building
projects.249 While this committee has no authority to make adjustments to the
FTA where it identifies problems deriving from a lack of capacity, a permanent
committee designed to assess capacity building needs is surely an important
aspect of this FTA.
These provisions are quite extraordinary and “groundbreaking”250—at least
in the context of previous FTAs. In breaking the mold of FTAs, they point the
way forward for future trade agreements by focusing the environmental
provisions of trade agreements on problems likely to emerge or be exacerbated
by liberalized trade. To the extent that these requirements fall short, it is that
they must be adopted within eighteen months after, not at some time prior to,
the date of entry into force of the FTA.251 Moreover, the FTA itself does not
include any funding to help Peru implement these provisions. While the United
States initially committed to funding implementation of the Annex on Forest
Sector Governance, it now appears to be backing away from that pledge.252 In
addition, it is not clear where the fund for the Trade Capacity Building
Committee will come from.253 Without committed funding, these provisions
may become nothing more than potential and promises unfilled, not unlike the
NAAEC.

248. Id. ¶ 20.4.1.
249. U.S.-Peru FTA, supra note 22, ¶ 20.4.3.
250. Office of the U.S. Trade Representative, Free Trade with Peru: Brief Summary of the
United States-Peru Trade Promotion Agreement, at 2 (June 2007) (describing the environmental
provisions of the U.S.–Peru FTA), available at http://www.ustr.gov/Trade_Agreements/Bilateral/
Peru_TPA/Section_Index.html.
251. U.S.-Peru FTA, supra note 22, Annex 18.3.4, ¶ 3.
252. Personal Interview with Kris Genovese, Attorney, Center for International
Environmental Law (July 15, 2008). Ms. Genovese has been very active in efforts to reform
Peru’s mahogany trade.
253. In a summary of the U.S.-Peru FTA, the United States acknowledged that it had
provided substantial resources for capacity building in the past and that future funds “could”
come from the World Bank and other sources:
The U.S. Government provided a total of approximately $58 million in trade capacity
building (TCB) assistance to Peru in fiscal years 2004 through 2006. Peru also has
benefited from U.S. government provided trade capacity building assistance to Andean
regional programs, totaling more than $8.5 million for the same period. Over the next
five years, trade-related assistance to Peru that is under consideration by the InterAmerican Development Bank and the World Bank could total over $600 million in
support of the agreement.
Office of the U.S. Trade Representative, Free Trade with Peru: Detailed Brief Summary of the
United States-Peru Trade Promotion Agreement, 10 (June 2007), available at
http://www.ustr.gov/Trade_Agreements/Bilateral/Peru_TPA/Section_Index.html.
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C. Public Participation
Whereas FTAs were once—and in some respects still remain—the
province of secretive governmental meetings and dispute resolution processes,
they have become much more open to public participation. Indeed, regional
FTAs have become essential promoters of public participation with all of the
U.S. post-NAFTA FTAs, providing opportunities for public participation in
environmental decisionmaking. How they promote public participation can
encourage an understanding of the environmental effects of FTAs.
1. Environmental Review of FTAs
As the CEC declared, “One of the strongest lessons of the CEC’s work in
the area of environmental assessments of trade is that outcomes are stronger
when the public is involved early, and involved often, in such assessments.
Transparency in the process of debating trade-environment linkages invariably
leads to stronger public policy outcomes.”254 Nevertheless, it is clear that a
lack of transparency pervaded the DR-CAFTA negotiations in Central
America, where, with the exception of Costa Rica, governments failed to make
information on the FTA publicly available and excluded members of civil
society from the negotiation process.255 FTAs should embrace a participatory
and transparent approach to evaluating trade-and-environment linkages.
2. Citizen Submission Process
The citizen submission process must be rethought. As many have
proposed, the easiest way to transform the citizen submission process would be
to eliminate the governments’ role in determining whether a factual record is
warranted.256 That simple change would help to ensure that process provides a
valuable avenue for citizens of some countries to voice concerns about failures
to enforce environmental law effectively.
However, it is clear that
governments view the process as adversarial and litigation-based257 and are
“more inclined to weaken the procedure rather than strengthen it.”258 As a
consequence, they have made every effort to thwart its effectiveness; the
254. Vaughan & Block, supra note 104, at 27.
255. Claire Ribando, DR-CAFTA: Regional Issues 4 (CRS Report, Updated July 8, 2005).
256. See, e.g., Wold et al., supra note 17, at 40; Randy Christensen & Albert Koehl, NAFTA
Needs Environmental Credibility, WINDSOR STAR, Mar. 8, 2008, available at http://www.eco
justice.ca/media-centre/press-clips/nafta-needs-environmental-credibility; JPAC, Advice to
Council: No. 01-07, Citizen Submissions on Enforcement Matters under Articles 14 & 15 of
NAAEC, J/01-03/ADV/01-07/Rev.3 (Oct. 23, 2001); TRAC, supra note 102, at 54
(recommending that Council “respect the role and authority of the executive director, in line with
a strict interpretation of the [NAAEC]”).
257. See supra Section III.C.
258. Kal Raustiala, Citizens Submissions and Treaty Review in the NAAEC, in GREENING
NAFTA, supra note 13, at 269.
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process has clearly not lived up to expectations. Given the history of
repression in Central America, it is entirely predicable that no Central
American person or organization has used the citizen submission process of
DR-CAFTA.259 The entire model is wrong.
Instead, future FTAs should design an approach that facilitates cooperation
rather than encourages an adversarial process. The members of the U.S.
National Advisory Committee, which provides advice to the Environmental
Protection Agency on issues relating to the NAAEC, recently proposed a nonadversarial, cooperative mechanism for the resolution of environmental
problems identified by citizens.260 This “problem-solving” process would
allow citizens to approach an independent Secretariat with issues unrelated to
enforcement failures and would not seek to assign blame for the specified
environmental concern. Instead, the process would help resolve environmental
problems:
[T]he Secretariat would work with the requestors and the Party or Parties
concerned to resolve the issue. The Secretariat’s functions would vary
depending on the nature of the issue. It would seek to identify technology,
information, financing, or other resources and catalyze resolution of the
problem. (Those resources could be available through governments,
businesses, academic institutions, non-profit institutions, international
organizations, etc.) In some cases, it might simply pass on such information to
the requestors; in others, it might facilitate direct contacts between the
requestors and other interested parties; in still others, it might prepare a short
report outlining an approach that all interested parties might consider taking.
Finally, in some cases it might determine after further consideration that it
261
cannot assist with resolution of the problem.

At its core, this proposal attempts to address the central issues that matter
to citizens: that their voices are heard and that officials respond to their
concerns in a meaningful way. The proposal upends the nature of the citizen
submission process by altering the nature of the process. Instead of an
allegation that the government has failed to enforce environmental law, the
process seeks ways to resolve specific environmental concerns. As such, the
proposal would help renew the spirit of cooperation that has been lost in the
NAAEC.

259. See supra Section IV.A.2.
260. Advice 2007-1, (May 24, 2007): Response to EPA’s request on potential projects for
consideration by the CEC with emphasis on their relevance to U.S. audiences, in Letter from M.
Dolores Wesson, Chair, National Advisory Committee, to Stephen Johnson, Administrator, U.S.
EPA, at 13 (May 24, 2007), available at http://www.epa.gov/ocem/nac/pdf/2007_may24_nac_
letter.pdf. This idea originated with Anne Perrault, Senior Attorney with the Center for
International Environmental Law.
261. Id.
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Another possible approach would focus the submission process on scale
effects. Under this approach, citizens could seek review of the effects of trade
liberalization on the environment. As with Article 13 reports under the
NAAEC, the Secretariat could assemble experts to ascertain whether the
environmental impacts were, in fact, caused by trade. If they were, then the
Secretariat could propose measures, including recommendations for capacity
building and technology, to mitigate those impacts. As with the previous
proposal, this proposal seeks to eliminate the hostility that pervades the current
submissions process by changing the focus of the process. This proposal does
not cast blame on any particular agency, official or company for environmental
wrongdoing. Rather, it asks whether a particular policy or measure is
adversely affecting the environment.
Whether either of these processes can transform a valuable avenue for
citizen participation in environmental decisionmaking is unknown. An
opportunity for citizens to focus on scale effects in a way that suggests trade
may not be beneficial could in fact be more controversial than the current
mechanism. In any event, because the current process is clearly not working as
intended, and with governments unwilling to let it work as intended, a new
model should be tested.
VI. CONCLUSION
FTAs now promise more than economic growth derived from trade
liberalization. The public has come to expect that FTAs will also produce
environmental benefits. Since the NAFTA negotiations culminated in the
adoption of an environmental side agreement—the NAAEC—each subsequent
FTA has adopted environmental provisions built on the NAAEC. Yet, the
NAAEC itself has sputtered, a victim of the very independence that Canada,
Mexico and the United States expressly and tacitly gave it. As a consequence,
the United States has withdrawn many of the NAAEC’s essential aspects from
subsequent FTAs. Some FTAs, such as the FTAs with Australia, Morocco and
Oman, do not include an environmental commission to coordinate
environmental activities. Many do not include a citizen submissions process.
None includes a quasi-independent Secretariat to evaluate issues within the
scope of the work program. Even where the post-NAAEC FTAs do not
fundamentally alter the framework included in the NAAEC—such as focusing
on competitiveness effects and enforcement issues—the model itself is flawed
and must be revisited. Without reorienting the environmental provisions of
FTAs to focus on scale effects of trade liberalization, the post-NAAEC FTAs
are unlikely to yield the environmental benefits many expect.
The U.S.-Peru FTA provides a glimmer of the environmental benefits that
FTAs could bring. In that FTA, negotiators assessed key weaknesses in Peru’s
environmental institutions. Finding significant illegal logging and illegal trade
in valuable timber species, particularly mahogany, the United States and Peru
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negotiated provisions that require Peru to undertake substantial reforms in its
forestry sector. These provisions are quite specific, calling on Peru to add
enforcement personnel to its forest sector, increase sanctions for violations of
relevant laws and even undertake surveys of timber species.262
Still more needs to be done. To adequately take into account scale effects,
provisions such as those included in the U.S.-Peru FTA should be implemented
prior to the entry into force of the FTA, not after it.263 To encourage public
participation so that citizens cannot only comment on potential environmental
effects of trade agreements but also better understand the benefits of trade
liberalization, governments must include citizens early in the process of
assessing the environmental effects of trade. Moreover, any citizen submission
process should be rethought.264 Because the NAAEC’s focus on enforcement
failures has put governments on the defensive, a process that encourages
collaboration may provide more positive environmental outcomes than the
NAAEC’s and DR-CAFTA’s citizen submission processes have.

262. See supra Section V.B.
263. See supra Section III.A.2.
264. See supra Section V.C.2.

